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
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Part 1:

Background and Significant Questions About JROTC

Introduction

The Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) is a large and very rapidly growing military presence in American high schools. It brings retired military personnel into public classrooms, teaches a military curriculum, and puts students in uniform. According to a federal regulation, its goal is to “create favorable attitudes and impressions toward the Services and toward careers in the Armed Forces.”¹

As the program expands, many students, teachers, and parents are asking, “Does this program belong in the public schools? What does it teach and how does it teach? What does the program promise school districts and what does it deliver? What are its economic and social costs? Does it recruit for the military?” This paper considers these questions and others through examination of the basic outlines of the JROTC program’s history, consideration of its distribution and relation to military manpower needs, and an analysis of its curriculum.

There are two ways to analyze the JROTC program. The first sets aside the question, “Should JROTC be in the public schools?” and simply asks whether the program produces the educational results it claims. We argue below that JROTC has not proven that it can or even attempts to deliver on its promises. The second kind of analysis asks the more fundamental question of whether the public schools should be used for the benefit of organizations like the military whose goals are not those accepted as the primary goals of public education in a democracy. We do not believe that a reformed version of the program is in the interest of America’s school children.

Public schools aim to provide safe, democratic schools that promote respect for others, critical thinking, and basic academic skills. We will argue that JROTC does not provide safety, but rather introduces guns into the schools; that it promotes authoritarian values instead of democratic ones; and that it uses rote learning methods and drill in lieu of critical thinking and problem-solving skills. Rather than devoting more of the

school day to academic subjects or basic skills, JROTC consigns most of student time in the program to learning skills, such as military history, drill, and protocol, that have little relevance except in the military. This is in keeping with its goal — stated in JROTC documents but frequently disavowed by JROTC personnel — of recruiting young people to military careers or to support the military’s interests.

The unchallenged acceptance of JROTC in the public schools presumes that military institutions are superior in several respects (efficiency and values, for example) to civilian ones; that military solutions are best suited to respond to contemporary social problems; and that the military’s interests are synonymous with the interests of the American people. Increasing media attention has been given to the sentiment that the civilian institutions of this democracy — including schools, government, and private organizations — have failed. Together, these ideas have helped fuel the militarization of those institutions rather than inspiring attempts to revitalize them with new efforts and funds.

More importantly, the amount of money available for the military remains very high despite the end of the Cold War — higher in 1994 (\$281 billion) than the Cold War peacetime average (\$250 billion in constant dollars). This leaves the military with tremendous financial resources. We will see that the military is making its way into schools that are underfunded, with low federal funding (\$25 billion for education at all levels) and eroding local tax bases. However, the problems that the schools face have deep social causes, such as a changing economy, urban de-industrialization, growing poverty, and racial discrimination (Orfield and Reardon 1993). The military not only has no solutions for these problems, but its involvement in the schools also diverts public funds away from educational programs run by trained, certified, and accountable teachers and other social programs run by youth-focused personnel.

“Considering the role of the school in educating citizens for participating in a democracy, the values fostered by the Army JROTC curriculum are clearly those of the military and not those students need to contribute to a democratic society.”
— Selden and Feldman 1975:5

The History of JROTC


The Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps was originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defense under the National Defense Act of 1916 to increase America's military readiness in the face of World War I; the program was implemented in 1919. Taught by retired military officers, JROTC covers three to four years of high school, and thus it can begin with 14 year-old students. The course, for which students can receive nonacademic elective credit or (in some districts) physical education credit,² involves classroom work with textbooks and military drill or marching, plus various other optional activities from which instructors can choose, such as rifle training. One day a week, students wear their uniforms to school, enhancing the visibility of the program and solidifying their own identity as soldiers.

During the 1993-94 school year, an average of 310,358 students nationwide participated in 2,267 JROTC units.³ As the result of a 1992 Department of Defense (DoD) request, funding for JROTC has undergone a radical expansion. By the fall of 1996, the number of units is expected to have nearly doubled from 1992's 1,500 units to 2,900 units, with more than \$44 million spent in Department of Defense funding to establish 462 new units in the first expansion year alone (see Figure 1). In addition to appropriating more money to the program, Congress

has raised the ceiling on the number of JROTC units permitted by law from 1,600 to 3,500 units.⁴ The Army branch of JROTC is growing most rapidly: units are anticipated to expand from 835 in 1992 to 1,700 by the start of the 1997-98 school year.

A second part of the JROTC expansion effort is the plan to establish at least forty JROTC academies. Known as "career academies" and "partnership academies," these more intensive JROTC programs combine a JROTC unit with an occupationally-focused curriculum. Thirty JROTC Career Academies have opened as of the fall of 1994; an additional ten Partnership Academies are slated to open in the 1995-1996 school year (see Appendix F).

The expansion of JROTC is meant to cultivate a public image for the military as efficacious, reliable, and concerned. In its public relations aspect, JROTC resembles a number of new and older programs: military bases used as "civilian boot camps" for troubled youth; the National Guard sent into elementary and high schools to teach science and math; troops sent with much media coverage to provide humanitarian aid after hurricanes or during famines; and military bands or military air shows engaged to entertain the public (see Vanneman 1994). Defense analysts note the special importance, from the military's perspective, of maintaining a highly visible, positive public presence among civilians at a time of threatened budget reductions (Goldich 1992). If an expanded role for the military on the domestic front can be established, an argument can be made for continued large military budgets and "for force levels higher than those warranted by visible and foreseeable threats, on grounds... [not only of domestic aid but] of not letting the military as an institution shrink to the point of what might be called 'social irrelevance'" (Goldich 1992). A press release announcing the expansion of the Army JROTC program in 1992 demonstrates the new self-fashioning as a social service by claiming, "The bulk of the expansion is targeted to the inner cities and rural America and is designed to assist 'students at risk.'"



Source: Department of Defense

What Are the Benefits of Serving in JROTC? How Helpful Is JROTC to Students Who Wish to Attend College?


The JROTC program promises advantages in service advancement and pay for the enlisted ranks (although not guaranteed admission to the military) and help in obtaining college ROTC and service academy scholarships (also not guaranteed) (U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command n.d.). Perhaps the most tangible benefit accrued by JROTC cadets is that they are eligible to enter the enlisted ranks at slightly higher pay grades than other (non-JROTC) recruits (Army Regulation 145-2 5:9).

The connection between JROTC participation and the awarding of college scholarships has often been misrepresented. Not only do JROTC graduates enter military programs at substantially higher rates than non-JROTC graduates (45 percent of them go directly into military programs), they are also largely funneled into the enlisted ranks as opposed to officer training programs (such as college ROTC, service academies, etc.). Approximately seven out of every ten cadet graduates who immediately go into military programs enter the services as enlisted members (see Figure 2).

Furthermore, not all participants in officer training programs receive college scholarships. For example, only 141 of the 284 1993 Naval JROTC graduates who went directly into college ROTC programs received scholarships.

JROTC officials also tout the importance of the program in securing admission to service academy programs, which provide full scholarships. JROTC graduates may apply for any of the service academies, not just the one affiliated with the service branch sponsoring their school's JROTC program. Strikingly few JROTC cadets enter service academies after graduation (about one percent, see Appendix C). JROTC program graduates represent a small number of the 3,649 persons entering the three service academies (the Army Academy at West Point, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy) as members of the class of 1996. College ROTC scholarships are available to high school students who are not in the JROTC program. Army officials estimate that, on average, 80 to 85 percent of the Senior (college) ROTC scholarships are awarded to students who have not participated in JROTC (U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command n.d.).

Proponents of JROTC sometimes erroneously refer to the standard educational plan available to enlisted members after the completion of service — known as The Montgomery GI bill — as if it were a JROTC scholarship benefit. Under this plan, enlisted service members who chose to enroll in the program contribute \$1,200 through payroll deductions; that amount is supplemented by government funds. Two things should be



noted. First, any enlisted service member and some officers are eligible to enroll in the program; JROTC graduates gain no advantage over non-JROTC students in obtaining these funds. Second, there are significant problems with the program that have resulted in many people being ruled ineligible to receive the benefit once they leave the military; refunds are not permitted under any circumstances. Rather than adding to the net scholarship funds young people have available, service members have in fact paid more in deductions (\$1.84 billion) than they have received in return (\$864 million) between 1985 and 1993 (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 3/8/93; *Army Times*, 11/15/93). The rules concerning eligibility to actually use the Montgomery GI Bill are more restrictive than those that have applied to other (preexisting) military educational plans. An Army lawyer has argued that these rules have resulted in the unfair treatment of service members and that they may be unconstitutional (Evans 1989). Although 71 percent of recruits

Only a small minority of JROTC graduates receive military funding to pursue college as a direct result of participating in the program.

have enrolled in the plan, only 35 percent of those enrolled have obtained funding.⁵

Proponents of JROTC often imply that participation in the program will lead to funding for

college. In actuality, only a small minority of JROTC graduates receive military funding to pursue college as a direct result of participating in the program.

Does JROTC Disproportionately Affect Minority Students and Poor School Districts?

JROTC programs are not randomly distributed around the country's high schools, nor do they appeal to an arbitrary selection of students within the selected schools. Programs are heavily clustered in Southern high schools (65 percent of all JROTC units are in 14 Southern states; see Table 1, Map 1) and in schools with a high proportion of minority students (see Figure 3, p.8).⁶ While the program claims to focus on "at risk" youth, this has not been independently verified.⁷ Such a test would be difficult, in fact, because it is not clear what the military means by "at risk" youth.

Schools with large African American or Latino/a populations are much more likely than other schools to have JROTC programs: schools that have Army units have 48 percent, and those with Navy units 39 percent African American and Latino/a students. These numbers are much higher than the 1991 national average of 27 percent African American and Latino/a students (National Center for Education Statistics 1993).

Americans constitute 34 percent of all students in schools that have Army JROTC programs, they are 42 percent of the schools' JROTC units.⁹ The overall result is that minority student participation in JROTC is approximately 54 percent nationwide (excluding the Marine units, for which such data were not made available; see Figure 3, p.8).

How has it happened that JROTC is disproportionately peopled with minority students? One reason for the disproportionate availability of the program to minority students is the correlation between race and class in America, with minority children overrepresented among the poor and residentially clustered in poor school districts (Orfield and Reardon 1993). JROTC units have been brought to and/or requested by many communities with (1) lower educational budgets that are believed to be supplemented by JROTC, a myth we dispel below; and (2) large numbers of young people with relatively poor job prospects after high school who are believed to have better chances of military or other employment with JROTC participation.¹⁰ In this context, pressures to establish and maintain JROTC units in schools often come from both school and military officials.

JROTC is presented by its proponents as being part of the solution to the crisis of public education in minority (especially African American) communities. As the program expands, parents and educators in these communities are asking whether JROTC programs enhance the educational and job opportunities of students. Little evidence of JROTC's effects exists, although we have already noted the controversy over the links between JROTC and college scholarships. While JROTC claims to prepare minority and low income students for adult success, neither dropout rates nor adult job attainment and wage levels have been measured and compared for JROTC and non-JROTC youth. But given that JROTC is a military program and that it promises (military-style) discipline, potential evidence relevant to JROTC claims can be found in research on the effect of military work on the life

Minority student participation in JROTC is approximately 54 percent nationwide.

Table 1 Regional Distribution of JROTC Units, Fall 1993⁸

| | | |
|---------------|------|--------|
| South | 65% | (1284) |
| Northeast | 7% | (140) |
| North Central | 12% | (233) |
| West | 14% | (275) |
| Overseas | 2% | (50) |
| Total | 100% | (1982) |

Source: Department of Defense

This pattern of JROTC placement — in the South and in schools with large minority populations — is the result of Department of Defense practice that puts units in non-affluent schools.

Once in the schools, the program has somewhat more success in recruiting minority students to the program. For example, in schools that have Navy JROTC, the programs recruit nine percent of schools' minority students compared to seven percent of their white students. A similar pattern holds true for African Americans in Army JROTC programs. Although African


chances of minority and other veterans. We look briefly at military service's impact on college attendance and on employment and wages.

The impact of military enlistment on the college enrollment of African American youth (especially young men) has been the subject of considerable controversy, with some educators and college admission officials arguing that the military diverts many African American youth from college who would otherwise go (Wiley 1990). They argue that this trend began when military salaries and benefits were increased in the early 1980s amidst continued high civilian unemployment rates. African American recruits were increasingly from a wealthier segment of the African American population than were white recruits in relation to the white population (Congressional Budget Office 1989).

This means that many African American youths who went into the military were from families who might have otherwise sent them directly to college. The military and colleges have been, in other words, in stronger competition for African Americans than whites; since the military has higher exposure through advertising and programs like JROTC, it has often won (Wiley 1990).¹¹ In any case, JROTC programs have not discernably increased African American male college enrollment: that figure has dropped five percentage points in the early 1990s, a fact attributable in large part to a decrease in the availability of financial aid, especially in the availability of grants vs. loans (Carter and Wilson 1993).

Another issue is the effect of military service on the work lives of African Americans. Overall, the military accounts for eleven percent of all employment among African Americans aged 18-29; for whites it is six percent (U.S. Congress 1992:130).¹² While the military is presented as an equal opportunity employer and has in fact provided large numbers of jobs to minority youth, proportionately more African American than white 18 year-olds who apply are rejected for military employment on the basis of the military aptitude tests.¹³ Additionally, it is expected that the military personnel cutbacks (known as the "drawdown") will result in African Americans being disproportionately ruled ineligible for entry into the services (Boesel 1992).

The idea that the military provides upward social mobility for minorities is also problematic. Post-Vietnam era veterans generally make less than demographically comparable non-veterans




Source: Department of Defense

(Barley 1994), a pattern which holds for both white and African American veterans (Crane and Wise 1987). The earnings gap between young veterans and non-veterans is greater, however, for whites than African Americans. This difference may reflect the significant training and employment challenges (including job discrimination) faced by young African Americans in the civilian world, veterans and non-veterans alike. The unemployment rate remains higher for African American veterans (and minority veterans as a whole) than for white veterans.¹⁴

Bryant and Wilhite (1990) have prepared a rigorous analysis of the impact of time in the military and training experience on the eventual civilian earnings of post-Vietnam era veterans. The results reveal a complex picture in which length of time per se spent in the military depresses wages substantially (by \$1.25 per hour in the 1980s for the typical three year stint), regardless of race. Dubious, then, are claims by recruiters for either JROTC or the regular military that experience in those groups, in and of itself, provides discipline and general life skills that improve employment prospects or yield higher wages.

Bryant and Wilhite and others have found that military training received in select occupational fields has a positive effect on wages for many veterans.¹⁵ These fields are primarily technical ones such as electronics and equipment

The JROTC program has not shown that it reduces minority dropout rates, facilitates minority college attendance, or raises earnings through better job placement in the civilian or the military world.



Sources: Department of Defense; National Center for Education Statistics 1993

repair, fields in which minorities have been underrepresented due to racial bias in service specialty assignments: for example, whites are over twice as likely as African Americans to get electronic equipment repair assignments (Laurence 1992:27). Moreover, studies have shown that civilian training programs in the same fields provide even higher rates of return on wages (Norrbloom 1976).

The JROTC program implies that it enhances the job prospects of minority cadets. The available evidence suggests otherwise or is inconclusive. The JROTC program has not shown that it reduces minority dropout rates, facilitates minority college attendance, or raises earnings through better job placement in the civilian or the military world. It is quite effective in recruiting minorities for the military, particularly those students who might otherwise make other more remunerative and less dangerous choices.

Does JROTC Deliver Equal Outcomes to Female and Male Cadets?

Like the military itself, JROTC needs female cadets to meet minimum enrollment requirements. Women were first permitted by law (Public Law 93-165, November 29, 1973) to join JROTC in order to help the program boost its enrollment after a steady period of decline. The JROTC program currently attracts large numbers of young women. In school year 1993-94, women made up 40 percent of JROTC cadets, with the proportion even higher in some units. For example, in 1991 58 percent of Oakland's 1,000 JROTC cadets were female (*Oakland Tribune*, 10/18/91). Nevertheless, there are very few female JROTC instructors (see Figure 4).

Given the heavily masculine associations of the military and of JROTC, the attraction for young women might seem enigmatic. One possible incentive is that young women, whose mobility is often more restricted by their families, see JROTC and the military as their opportunity for escape, travel, and adventure. If women experience discrimination in the job market and have more limited job prospects, they, like African American men, might find the promises of JROTC to prepare them for military careers an attractive option. Current Army military recruiting material promotes the notion that women are less likely to face gender-based job

discrimination in the military than in the civilian world and that the military provides a unique opportunity for young women to expand their horizons. For example, a March 1990 pamphlet entitled "ARMY – Opportunities for Women" contains the following section headers: "Do you want work that's more than a predictable routine?; Are you tired of hearing, 'That's not a job for a woman?'; Are you ready to do things you never thought you could do?" These ads may also suggest that the military values dominant in JROTC and in the military are gender-neutral.

The JROTC program, like the military generally, particularly appeals to African American women. They join the military at much higher rates than both their white counterparts and African American men. In 1994, approximately 30 percent of active duty military women, and 48 percent of Army enlisted women, were African American. By contrast, African American women made up 13 percent of American women of comparable age and 11 percent of employed civilian women (Department of Defense 1993; Women's Research and Education Institute 1994). A 1985 study found that African American women were attracted to the service as a source of employment (including salary, enlistment bonuses, and health benefits) and technical training (Enloe and Jordan 1985).


The irony is that women, and African American women in particular, are clustered in the service's lower job grades, even though they have lower rates of disciplinary action, dishonorable discharge, and AWOL than any other race-sex group (Enloe and Jordan 1985). African American women are more heavily concentrated (74 percent) in the five lowest pay grades than African American men (70 percent), white women (64 percent) and white men (59 percent). In addition, only 7 percent of African American military women are in the officer corps, compared to 21 percent of white women.¹⁶ Enlisted women are clustered in jobs that are considered soft skill positions: 38 percent of enlisted women serve in functional support and administration occupations, while only 14 percent of enlisted men hold these positions (U.S. General Accounting Office 1992a). Those young women who have joined JROTC in hopes of entering high skilled positions and officer programs that provide college scholarships may be more often disappointed than their male peers.

When JROTC introduces military culture and ritual into the schools, it introduces a culture that is decidedly masculine and often actively hostile to women. This makes the program problematic for both female cadets and for the school as a whole. Despite efforts to appear or actually to be welcoming to women, the military — which trains JROTC instructors, writes the curriculum, and sets the tone for the program — remains a male dominated institution. The centrality of masculine identity to the contemporary military is documented in numerous studies (e.g., Enloe 1993; Cohn 1987; Herbert 1993). Herbert (1993) writes, "It is one thing for women to enter occupations which have previously been defined as 'male'; it is another to enter an occupation in which masculinity is so central a part of the definition of the occupation" (50). Basic training continues to hold out the male combat soldier as the ideal soldier, with female terms (including often degrading ones) commonly used to define those who fail to be good soldiers (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978; Herbert 1993). Female soldiers are marginalized as a result. A culture of sexual harassment of women continues in many kinds of military settings, according to recent studies, including both the armed forces (Enloe 1993:172; Morris 1994) and the service academies (U.S. General Accounting Office 1994). For example, twenty-four servicewomen reported being raped or sex-

ually abused by officers or fellow soldiers during the Gulf War (Enloe 1993:190). While the military does not explicitly condone such acts, it has been slow in developing disciplinary action or policy concerning the rights of female soldiers, as evidenced by the Tailhook investigation. There are reports that the situation has worsened in the post-Tailhook era (*San Diego Union-Tribune*, 3/10/94; Pohl 1994).

Of course, being in JROTC is not the same as being on active duty, and JROTC training is not as rigorous and brutal as basic training. At the same time, JROTC is quite different from other school programs in that it serves as an introduction to the military way of doing things. Given the masculine orientation of the military and the overwhelmingly male composition of the JROTC instruction staff, a curriculum that does not actively create a non-sexist atmosphere is likely one which creates a context for harassment of women and disincentives to challenge it when it occurs. As a military culture, the program might be expected to be a cultural environment which disadvantages the women who try to operate within it, even as young women often choose to tough out or adapt to the environment. The experience of young women in JROTC programs deserves more careful study to understand how they are affected.

Figure 4 Percent Female Composition of JROTC Cadets, Instructors, & Active Duty Services



Sources: Department of Defense; Women's Research & Education Institute 1994

Is JROTC a Recruiting Tool?

The substantial expansion of the JROTC program has occurred in response to a number of factors. First is the military's need for more and better trained recruits in an era of shrinking young adult populations with lower literacy rates. The "prime recruiting market" has declined from 1.8 million in 1985 to 1.1 million young people in 1994, and the intent to enlist has decreased among all demographic groups as evidenced by results of recent surveys of high school seniors, known as the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) (*Army Times*, 10/4/93; *Washington Post*, 3/16/94).

In this context, the JROTC program contributes significantly to service recruitment goals: 45 percent of all cadets who successfully complete JROTC enter some branch of the service, a rate much higher than the general student population (see Figure 2). While Army JROTC materials produced to attract school districts and students to the program state that the program is not a recruiting tool, an Army regulation (32 CFR 542.5:3c) states that JROTC "should create favorable attitudes and impressions toward the Services and toward careers in the Armed Forces." In spite of this, JROTC instructors and administrators continue to assert that JROTC does not recruit for military service, which neutralizes the misgivings some parents experience.

Recruiting is also evident in the career counseling sections of the texts. 'Career exploration' is encouraged, but only in *Leadership Education and Training (LET) 3* (the third level or junior year JROTC text) are any careers other than the military listed (267). *LET 2* (the second level or sophomore year text) provides two pages of non-specific advice on civilian career opportunities and 4 1/2 pages of very concrete and more enthusiastic descriptions of military careers. The latter text mentions, for example, that "besides being the largest employer in the nation, the military offers the widest choice of career opportunities" (222). In the other texts, the "four-step process needed to enlist" is elucidated (*LET 2*:220), the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (the military entrance and placement examination) is described (*LET 3*:267), the service academies are touted (*LET 3*:269), and "types of military career paths" are traced (*LET 1*:40).

The other service branches have in their curricula a similar pro-military career bias. For example, *Naval Science 2* (the second level Navy

JROTC text) states that one of the objectives of NJROTC is "to develop an interest in the military service as a possible career" (Sundt 1991:3-4). Also, *Naval Science 1* reads: "Usually the naval recruiters in a given area do a lot with local high school NJROTC units... Recruiting office personnel should be invited to the annual NJROTC military ball. The recruiters are good people to get to know" (1991:90). Marine Corps guidelines for JROTC instructor applicants make the recruiting link even more explicit. One of the qualifications for a Marine Corps JROTC instructor is that the applicant have served at least one tour of duty in one of four or five specific occupational areas, military recruiting being one of them.¹⁷

There is increasing evidence that the JROTC expansion program is intended in part to increase African American interest in enlisting in the military. All of the service branches, but especially the Army, are concerned about an anticipated drop in enlistment rates among qualified (based on AFQT scores) African American men. Recent surveys of high school students regarding their inclination to enlist show a 45 percent drop among 16 to 21 year-old African American men over the last three years (*Army Times*, 10/4/93). The Army's Marketing Research Branch conducted studies in 1993 of what they term "the black prospect market" as well as research in support of the JROTC expansion project (U.S. Army Marketing Research Branch 1993). The research included focus group studies of students' responses to pamphlets, posters, taglines, and logos for the expansion program, studies which were said to have revealed that "prospects were most interested in products [pamphlets, etc.] that conveyed the themes of fun, action, and teamwork." The Research Branch also noted, somewhat elliptically, that "prospects were very sensitive to the balanced and integrated portrayal of cadets of different genders and ethnic backgrounds."

Overall, this research indicated to the Marketing staff that declining interest in the military service could be attributed to "recent negative media coverage." Blaming the messenger rather than noting the realistic assessment since the Gulf Crisis that service entails substantial potential risk, the staff proposed a public relations solution: "counter negative perceptions caused by concerns over unstable political situations

The JROTC program contributes significantly to service recruitment goals: 45 percent of all cadets who successfully complete JROTC enter some branch of the service, a rate obviously much higher than the general student population.

around the world that could involve military deployment [i.e., make a recruit feel he or she is less likely to have to go to war], the impact of current social issues on the military [i.e., make issues of race, gender and sexual orientation less visible], and the election of a president perceived to be anti-military [i.e., deflect attention from Clinton's role as Commander-in-Chief]" (U.S. Army Marketing Research Branch 1993). This suggests that both the JROTC program as well as enticements to service are being developed with attention to African American recruitment. JROTC texts and promotional videos, which

have been at least "washed" with multicultural images, assist in this project.

JROTC is a much less expensive recruiting tool than other advertising and marketing programs. One Congressional estimate is that \$2 billion of the defense budget is spent on recruiting, including costly television ads and a nationwide network of 31,000 recruiters (*Army Times*, 10/4/93; *Washington Post*, 3/16/94). This expense makes the hidden recruiting of JROTC in public school classrooms even more attractive for the military and puts increased pressure on local school boards.

What Are the Claims of JROTC? What Are the Outcomes?

The JROTC program has a large number of expressed goals. The first is to make its cadets "better Americans," a concept that is never explicitly defined. The JROTC model of citizenship bears no similarity to the ideals of critical thinking and free speech many Americans associate with citizen-training; extrapolating from the text, a 'better American' is simply one who unquestioningly supports all military endeavors or becomes a soldier, as we will show in curricular analysis in Part Two.

JROTC also makes an unsubstantiated claim to provide discipline for students.¹⁸ Without specifying techniques by which JROTC purportedly instills discipline, proponents tout the program as an effective method of channeling unruly teenagers into productive behaviors. The program's emphasis on drill — students spend at least three times as many hours in drill as in any other activity — suggests that repetitive marching somehow inculcates discipline; if so, this is a limited idea of discipline with little application outside of military environments. Indeed, the expressed learning outcomes for drill, known in the Army JROTC curriculum as 'leadership lab,' are remarkably narrow: to "demonstrate a knowledge of the history of and reasons for drill, the roles of drill participants and the leadership skills of drill leaders" and to "demonstrate proficiency in the proper manner to wear the JROTC uniform; how to properly wear awards, decorations and insignia; and executing individual drill (with or without arms), squad drill and platoon drill" (Army Junior ROTC Curriculum Outline 1990:7).

Discipline or self-regulation can be achieved in regular school programs. This happens, for example, when extracurricular team membership depends on good grades in core subjects, or

when the benefits of education are demonstrated in an after school jobs program. Many other school or extra-curricular activities (such as music programs) teach self-discipline and encourage enthusiasm for learning.

More recently, JROTC promoters have argued that the program benefits "at risk" students. This label is itself problematic. Initially adopted by educators to indicate a student's risk of dropping out, the label's meaning has shifted to connote a potential capacity for violence, drug use, or crime. Furthermore, educators have been pressured to identify 'at risk' students at earlier and earlier ages, beginning in elementary school before any evidence of substance abuse or criminal activity exists. As a result, minority and/or working class children have been disproportionately tagged 'at risk,' invoking a now discredited deficit model of education.

The imprecision of 'at risk' lends itself to stereotyping, labelling, and often tracking; the term can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As educational theorist Swadener notes, "the connotations of being 'at risk' are many, and do not contribute to the healthy self-esteem and sense of cultural and gender identity called for, ironically, by so many reports on 'at risk' children (as well as by others not contributing to this construct)" (1990:30-31). For this reason, some educators are now wary of employing the term. They argue that schools, not children, should be considered 'at risk,' as it is the school's responsibility to accommodate the variety of student needs rather than vice versa (Swadener 1990:29; Tillman 1991:80).

The claims made by JROTC to assist 'at risk' students are as vague as the term. JROTC rarely specifies which young people (the poor? some or

Students spend at least three times as many hours in drill as in any other activity.

In a decade when states are mandating end-of-course tests and school districts are shifting to outcome-based education, JROTC programs are not held answerable to school boards or the public for the claims they advertise or for their impact on students.

all minorities?) and which risks (drug use? violent behavior? dropping out of high school? not attending college?) it addresses. Proponents give the impression that JROTC deals with multiple problems — from the children who come to school with guns to the fatherless child’s need for a paternal figure. In fact, Lt. Col. Rufus Saxon, who runs JROTC programs in Detroit, makes this claim: “There are a lot of kids in all school districts who don’t get the guidance they need from their parents. Fifty-five percent [of those in Detroit] are below the poverty line; 67 percent are from single-parent families” (*Army Times* 7/17/92). The popularity of the program with some schools is based in part on the perception that it provides a place to put problem students who might otherwise drop out or disrupt the regular classroom, and that it is a substitute for gangs, drugs and negative peer pressure. In the request to Congress for expansion of the program, then Budget Director Richard Darman commended it as part of the “Defense Department’s efforts to influence positively the nation’s youth” and noted there would be an “emphasis on the inner cities.” President Bush transmitted the request with a broad promise that the “JROTC program is an effective method by which the U.S. armed forces can assist in addressing the problems facing America’s youth.” This vague language gives the impression of success without making specific claims that could be verified.

who wish to join. Once a program is established and regularly meets its enrollment goal, instructors often confer with middle school counselors to determine which students are ‘behavior problems’ and then refuse those students entry into the program. In addition, federal law (10 U.S. Code § 2031:b4) states, “No [JROTC] unit may be established or maintained at an institution [i.e., school] unless the institution agrees to limit membership in the unit to students who maintain acceptable standards of academic achievement and conduct.” Some branches have an explicit policy to bar students considered most ‘at risk.’ For example, Navy JROTC does not admit students who are “academic failures or disciplinary problems” and students will be dismissed from the program if they fail to maintain a C average (Sundt 1991:11). Indeed, JROTC’s goals of recruiting “quality” personnel for the volunteer military and of doing local public relations would be undermined if JROTC cadets were seen as creating trouble or failing in school.

The JROTC program regularly claims that it reduces dropout rates. A 1992 Army Cadet Command press release claims, “Junior ROTC has proven effective as a program which enhances the graduation rate.” Current Army JROTC publicity materials (for example, an Army packet entitled “Building a Better School and Better Students,” March 1994) makes the specific claim that “at some schools, JROTC seniors graduate at a rate that’s 20 percent higher than other seniors.” Nonetheless, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps do not even collect information on their cadets’ and former cadets’ graduation rates; it is not clear what types of statistics are maintained by the Army.¹⁹

It is impossible to make sense of these claims in light of the fact that JROTC cadets fail to complete the full (three or four year) program at remarkably high rates (see Table 2). This dramatic falloff in JROTC enrollment from one year to the next cannot be accounted for simply by the fact that some schools have only three year programs, for it occurs at every level of the program. Neither can it be explained as a short-term consequence of the JROTC expansion program.²⁰ In school year 1991-92, a pre-expansion year, each succeeding Army JROTC class was approximately half of the preceding year’s class size. This general trend continues into the present.

It is not known why so many students leave the JROTC program or whether they tend to graduate or drop out of school. One cannot

Table 2 JROTC Enrollment by Grade Level

| | Army (91-92) | Army (93-94) | Navy (93-94) | Marines (93-94) |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Freshman | 68,098 | 94,471 | 24,116 | 5,316 |
| Sophomore | 31,706 | 31,923 | 7,559 | 3,732 |
| Junior | 17,765 | 17,345 | 4,496 | 2,600 |
| Senior | 8,723 | 8,761 | 2,488 | 1,764 |

(Note: These numbers are taken from enrollment reports compiled near the beginning of the school year.)

Source: Dept. of Defense; Army JROTC Fact sheet, 1991-92 school year; Army JROTC Public Affairs Office.

The alleged benefit to ‘at risk’ students rarely materializes, partially because the program often refuses to take teenagers with behavior problems or low achievement histories. In order for a school to retain a JROTC unit, the unit must enroll either 10 percent of the student body or 100 students, whichever number is lowest. In lean years when enrollment is low, JROTC instructors will recruit heavily at the feeder middle schools and will accept virtually all students

assess the impact of JROTC on dropout rates without taking into account students who leave the program and those who are ruled ineligible for it. In fact, any small, exclusive program holds more attractions and interest for the students participating in it than large, more anonymous programs (Fine 1994). Given this, one would need to compare student motivation gained through JROTC with motivation gained through similarly well funded non-military programs with equally small class size. Such a comparison might show that what money is spent for JROTC would be better spent reducing class size in general or in creating support classes for students who have already failed a year or more of school.

The phenomenon of dropping out of schools is complex. Recent educational research on dropout issues suggests that how schools respond to students' needs is a factor in their decisions to leave school (Stevenson and Ellsworth 1993). At issue is a wide range of school practices, from how the system of discipline and rewards is administered, to the quality of sex education, to how students are labeled. Proponents of JROTC tend to oversimplify the problems, declare victory and move on.

Nonetheless, the military does have a vested interest in encouraging potential recruits to complete high school, as it reduces the services' training costs for those cadets who join the military. It is important to note that military recruiters are rewarded with the cooperation of school officials for encouraging students to graduate. Common forms of cooperation include access to lists of student names, addresses, and

phone numbers, school visits, and widespread school use of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), the military's entrance and placement examination (Jordan 1985). At times JROTC instructors, employing the rhetoric of military recruiters, promote graduation as a means to enlistment in the military services.²¹ This contradicts the military's emphatic denial that JROTC is a recruiting tool.

Finally, JROTC professes to prevent drug abuse: for example, a 1992 program press release states that "Junior ROTC has proven effective as a program...curbing such undesirable activities as substance abuse." In actuality, only a small and perfunctory portion of the curriculum is devoted to drug abuse. According to Army JROTC curriculum materials, five instructional hours are devoted to drug education, whereas 33 instructional hours are dedicated to drill. The information provided in the text is fairly standard, resembling that provided to high school students in regular classrooms across the country. There is no evidence that JROTC deters drug use or attempts to assess the effectiveness of its drug education program.

Given the very large amount of public money invested in the JROTC program, this lack of accountability on dropout rate reduction and drug education effectiveness is disturbing. In a decade when states are mandating end-of-course tests and school districts are shifting to outcome-based education, JROTC programs are not held answerable to school boards or the public for the claims they advertise or for their impact on students (also see Appendix G).

Poorer schools may take on a JROTC unit in an attempt to gain resources not received through their tax base, but the unit in fact drains resources from other educational programs in the district through its cost-sharing requirements.

What Are the Trade-Offs for Schools?

Poorer schools may take on a JROTC unit in an attempt to gain resources not received through their tax base, but the unit in fact drains resources from other educational programs in the district through its cost-sharing requirements. Resources are added to the local district by the Department of Defense (e.g., a portion of the JROTC instructors' salaries), but in return, the local district supports the Department of Defense with resources in the form of partial support for salaries, benefits, classrooms and other facilities, and utilities. Those resources can be substantial.

The precise cost to a school district varies substantially from place to place. Estimates

given in JROTC promotional materials disguise the full cost of the program. The Army estimates the monthly cost (in 1993) to a school per instructor to range from \$800 to \$1,700 depending on the person's military rank.²² This figure underestimates the true cost of the program to schools in several regards. First, schools cover a portion of instructor salaries. Federal law requires that JROTC instructors, who are always retired military service members, be paid, at minimum, what they would be making if they were to return to active duty. This figure includes various salary supplements (housing allowances, etc.) that are part of the basic military benefit package. The military

In the San Diego Unified School District, these and other expenses for eight JROTC units cost the district an estimated \$300,935 more than regular academic classroom subjects.

retiree's pension is offset against this figure. Typically, school districts are responsible for paying (at minimum) fifty percent of the difference between the amount of the pension and the required minimum salary. More importantly, JROTC instructors may be paid more than the federally-mandated minimum and they are encouraged to negotiate higher salaries with the school district. All additional salary must be covered by the school district. Also, school districts are responsible for paying 100 percent of civilian benefits received by the instructors. This includes health insurance, disability, retirement, the cost of prescription plans (if regular teachers have them), and any other benefit normally provided to regular school district teaching staff.

In the San Diego Unified School District, these and other expenses for eight JROTC units cost the district an estimated \$300,935 more (in 1992) than regular academic classroom subjects (Jahnkow 1994:3). The costs of JROTC are often higher because the programs require a minimum of two instructors, special clerical support, and significant facilities, including not only a class-

room but also an office, a storage room for materials and equipment, and sometimes a firing range (Jahnkow 1994:4). School facilities must be renovated when a unit is brought to campus. Some school districts construct new buildings or renovate wings of existing ones. For example, the Brownsville, Texas school board approved \$312,000 in 1992 for the construction of an Air Force JROTC unit at a local high school (*The Brownsville Herald*, 4/18/93). Finally, the standard contracts schools sign with the military require schools to cover other costs such as field trips and bonding. These resources support a program that enrolls an average of only 137 students per year.

These expenses represent a real trade-off for school districts that are already struggling to finance the costs of the basic educational programs for all students. The accounting in each case is different and, unfortunately, not often explicitly done by school districts. If it were, it might show that the program's financial resources are not offset by its costs, resulting in a net drain on school budgets.

Who Are the JROTC Instructors?

A minimum of two military officers are assigned to each JROTC class — a retired officer and a retired non-commissioned officer (a senior enlisted person). JROTC instructors must receive military certification and meet any applicable criteria in the state and local school district where they work. Retired military personnel can receive certification from the military to teach in a JROTC program with as little as a high school diploma or its equivalent. The military certification process involves review of a brief application form and heavily emphasizes standards of personal appearance.²³ States and local districts may or may not place additional certification requirements on these instructors; we know of few cases where these requirements are comparable to those of regular classroom teachers even though the JROTC curriculum includes subject areas like history and social studies.

The JROTC program has come under criticism from teachers' unions for "contracting out" jobs to non-union employees. Some have questioned whether standards are lowered in the process. The JROTC program raises a number of other problems for teachers' unions, aside from this certification issue. JROTC instructors are not

necessarily paid according to standing teachers' contracts; they are paid as if they were active duty military people. In some cases, JROTC instructors may receive higher compensation than other teachers, even though they may come in without full teaching credentials or teaching experience.

JROTC supporters cite the savings to school districts resulting from the Defense Department's paying some, or temporarily all, of the costs of the instructors. However, the fact that a minimum of two instructors must be hired usually wipes out any expected savings. In any case, the trade-off is often that of a union position for a non-union JROTC position and is one that some teachers' unions may be unwilling to make.

A case in point is the Bethlehem (PA) Education Association, which opposed and helped to prevent placement of a JROTC unit in a local high school in 1993. The union would not accept a different pay scale for JROTC instructors, taking the position that JROTC instructors must be paid on the same scale as other teachers employed by the district, regardless of the military retirement pay and benefits they were receiving. In a context of budget-cut-

ting and elimination of other electives, the school board reversed an earlier decision and decided it could not justify bringing in the JROTC program.

School districts may have non-discriminatory hiring policies that are subverted by the military's control over the hiring of JROTC instructors. The military's criteria for hiring JROTC teachers are in conflict with school district non-discrimination policies, policies that protect

the rights of people with disabilities as well as sexual minorities (The latter policies are more common in urban, public school districts.). There is also an intrinsic gender bias in hiring: the Air Force JROTC program in 1993, for example, had 937 male and 13 female instructors; the Army currently has 2,740 male and 17 female instructors (see Figure 4 and Appendix E).

Do the Educational Methods Used in the JROTC Program Meet Accepted Standards for Good Teaching?

Typically an education degree is not required of JROTC instructors. Therefore, few instructors receive direct, extensive training in the wide variety of teaching methods employed by educators. Most instructors rely on lesson plans supplied by the Cadet Commands that consist mainly of lectures supported by overhead transparencies of key words and concepts; fill-in-the-blank workbook exercises that do not challenge students to do more than reproduce verbatim what they have just read are the major evaluation tools. This uniformly teacher-centered method of instruction dominates the JROTC classroom; student participation is generally relegated to drill exercises. JROTC lessons have not incorporated the more interactive methods of pedagogy that are widely used in the field of education.

Significantly, there is normally no meaningful oversight of the JROTC curriculum by local school boards or districts. One of the few instances where a local school board did review the (Air Force) JROTC curriculum in detail was in the San Diego Unified School District. The review committee determined that: "some of the materials are out of date"; "many historical events are presented in narrow, simplistic ways, and, in some cases, are inaccurately represented"; "the narrative style is didactic and doesn't encourage critical thinking"; "generally, only the military point of view is presented"; "some of the materials lack sensitivity to ethnic groups, women, and religion" (Liddell 1994). Because of the military's status as a federal institution, JROTC is perceived as a "nationally validated curriculum" and therefore not scrutinized. Despite this perception, the curriculum is rarely reviewed in detail by any educational body; it has only to be approved by the JROTC Cadet

Commands. Where local review is done, it usually consists of no more than a superficial review of the curriculum outline, not the actual textbooks.

The curriculum itself is problematic, as we demonstrate more fully in the second part of this report: this is evident when we compare the JROTC text (*Leadership Education and Training*) to a standard, widely used civics text (*Civics: Responsibilities and Citizenship* [1992] by David Saffell). The citizenship sections of the JROTC texts are militarized, providing only a short discussion of civil rights (LET 2:196-202); a relatively long discussion of military justice and law enforcement (LET 3:255-265); a lesson on 'Our American Values' that includes the 'definition and importance of military values'; and a lesson on 'Army Customs and Courtesies' (LET 1:48-51). By contrast, the *Civics* text treats political participation, rather than military service, as the defining feature of citizenship. When the text does mention the armed forces, it is embedded in a larger context, such as a consideration of the balance of powers between branches of government. More specifically, the civilian text mentions the careful system devised to control the military's power by the framers of the Constitution:

Military power can sometimes be a threat to a nation's government. Many times in history, the military leaders of a country have used force to take over their government. The writers of the Constitution hoped to avoid this danger by making the President, a non-military person, the commander of the armed forces. For the same reason, they divided responsibility for the military between the executive and legislative branches (Saffell 1992:234).

Typically, an education degree is not required of JROTC instructors.

The JROTC curriculum defines leadership as respect for constituted authority and the chain of command rather than as the ability to imagine new goals and promote democratic consensus-building. JROTC also conflates leadership and followership.

Historical events presented in the JROTC curriculum are distorted by the omission of certain facts and/or perspectives. For example, the Army JROTC text only vaguely alludes to the Holocaust in describing World War II, the sole statement being that “Nazi troops rounded up Jews, Slavs and other so-called ‘undesirables’ [i.e., homosexuals and Communists] as they advanced to be herded off to concentration camps or murdered” (LET 3:208). In another case, the text asserts that in the first 100 years of American history, the nation “was united and dedicated to ensuring equality for all” (LET 1:215), which is of course untrue given slavery, the inability of women to vote, and strong regional, class, and other conflicts. In describing Martin Luther King, the text fails to mention the central fact of his pacifism.

In JROTC, history is described as a linear series of accomplishments by soldiers, while the progress engendered by regular citizens is marginalized. In *Civics* (the civilian text), on the other hand, a series of ‘American Profiles’ demonstrates the contributions of individuals — such as John Marshall, Rachel Carson, Margaret Chase Smith, Howard Jarvis, Marion Wright Edelman, Wally Amos, and Eleanor Roosevelt — to their communities and their country. This list of individuals profiled in the civics text is

notable for its breadth: people of different occupations (a businessman/literacy advocate, politicians, an environmentalist, a lobbyist for children’s health and education) and different political opinions are included.

The JROTC curriculum defines leadership as respect for constituted authority and the chain of command rather than as the ability to imagine new goals and promote democratic consensus-building. JROTC also conflates leadership and followership. For example, the Naval JROTC text tells students:

The mark of a true soldier has always been loyalty and obedience to leaders. It is the same for NJROTC cadets, who are learning to become better citizens and leaders in their schools, communities, and nation...Among the traits of a good follower, loyalty is at the top of the list. This means loyalty to those above us in the chain of command, whether or not we agree with them. Stephen Decatur, a hero of the war with Tripoli, put it this way: ‘My country, may she ever be right. But right or wrong, my country.’ (Sundt 1991:24)

On the other hand, *Civics* makes a concerted effort to teach critical thinking, including a section on ‘techniques used by interest groups,’ a lesson on ‘how to distinguish fact from opinion,’ and a lesson on ‘how to evaluate information’

Civilian Text

From *Civics*, p. 403:

Throughout your life you will have to make decisions about different matters. You could make serious mistakes if you base your decisions on information that is faulty or not true. You may have already had the experience of making such a mistake.

There are ways, however, to help protect yourself from making mistakes because of bad information. You should always ask yourself the following questions when evaluating information:

- Is the information factual? Information is often presented as fact when it is really a guess, a generalization, an assumption, or an opinion. Facts are statements or observations that can be verified or proven. They are supported by evidence. The better the evidence, the more reliable are the facts. When evaluating information start by deciding if the information seems believable. Then look for evidence that verifies the facts.

- Do I have ALL the facts? People sometimes make mistakes when they draw conclusions from

information that is incomplete, only partially true, or based on only one example. In evaluating information, try to learn all the facts that relate to an issue. The more facts and evidence you have the more confidence you can have in the reliability of the information.

- Where did this information come from? People often make mistakes when they draw conclusions from information based on rumor or unreliable sources. Some of the best sources of information are personal observations, eyewitness accounts, and physical evidence. In many cases, information from an expert is better than information from a casual observer. Therefore, when evaluating information, always consider the source.

- How up-to-date is the information? People can make mistakes when they draw conclusions from information that is no longer true. When evaluating information, always consider how current and timely it is.

- Is the information accurately stated? An important step in deciding whether or not to trust information is to consider the way it is communicated.

(Saffell 1992:185,193,403; see box below). Regarding consensus-building, the *Civics* text includes a lesson on ‘how to run a meeting’ that instructs students to “give each person ample time to discuss each item before calling a vote” and to abide by majority-rule (110).

The core values upon which the JROTC program is established diametrically oppose standard educational values. Schools share a commitment to developing among students skills, such as the ability to evaluate information sources, that are imperative for the cultivation of a democratic society. In contrast, JROTC promulgates a highly authoritarian approach to information that discourages criticism and glorifies the unbroken chain-of-command; the program’s heavy emphasis on drill signifies this approach.

Similarly, educators strive to create pluralistic educational environments that encourage respect for those who are culturally different and/or those who hold dissimilar opinions. JROTC, on the other hand, excludes certain groups of Americans (students with disabilities and, according to wider military policies, sexual minority students); furthermore, its view that ‘America is best’ is often predicated on the denigration of other cultures (see examples below).

Finally, at a time when schools are employing a variety of methods, from peer conflict media-

tion to metal detectors, to curb incidents of violence in the school, create safe learning environments, and teach peaceful means of conflict resolution, JROTC’s introduction of weapons training, its partnership with the NRA to sponsor marksmanship matches, and its modeling of militaristic solutions to problems contradict schools’ stated opposition to violence. Many schools accept JROTC’s claim that the program benefits students prone to acts of violence without recognizing the irony of looking to the military as a solution for violent behavior.

Overall, the JROTC program brings the military into public schools ostensibly to do work that can and should be done by people trained to do that work. That includes teaching American history, civics, communications and nutrition; inspiring young people to make a life’s work out of what best suits them; encouraging character development; raising self-esteem; and preventing dropouts and drug abuse. These are not the aims of the American military, nor should they be. However much instructors and cadets may feel the program benefits students, JROTC is primarily intended to serve the recruitment and public relations needs of the military. The needs of students are subordinate or in conflict with that, as we will see in examining the curriculum.

Many schools accept JROTC’s claim that the program benefits students prone to acts of violence without recognizing the irony of looking to the military as a solution for violent behavior.

Part 2:

The Army JROTC Curriculum: An Analysis of Civics, History, and Leadership Training

The stated mission of JROTC is “to motivate young people to be better Americans.” We question whether it is possible or beneficial to teach as if there were one best way to be an American. In this section we examine the military ideal of an American as presented in the curriculum. We look here primarily at the Army textbooks, but our examination of the Air Force and Navy texts indicates they are quite similar in their methods and orientation.

The Army is the largest service branch and has the largest number of programs around the country.²⁴ Its textbooks, *Leadership Education and Training (LET)*, are divided into four levels (1-4). Each level contains a unit on citizenship (average 10.5 classroom hours), communication (10 hours), leadership (10 hours), cadet challenge/physical fitness (10 hours), leadership lab/drill (33 hours), drug prevention (5 hours), and American military history (7 hours). In addition, three levels have a unit on first aid (5 hours), map reading (average 6 hours), and career selection (2 hours), and two levels have sections on the role of the Army (4 hours) and on technology (6 hours). Additionally, up to twenty-five percent of the curriculum may include “optional subjects” (which, if incorporated into the program, students are required to participate in) like “Marksmanship and Safety” or “Army Customs and Courtesies.”

The tone of the textbooks is straightforward, with a voice that suggests the reader will easily understand what is said. The world as described by the JROTC textbooks is an uncomplicated one where values can be listed in a small orderly

set and (unrealistically) are not in conflict with each other. The simple vocabulary puts the text at a lower reading level than most ninth to twelfth grade texts. The texts offer a cheerful briskness matching the quality of some of the simple drawings of smiling officers and students.²⁵

Much more than in the regular classroom, text learning is supplemented by extra-classroom learning in JROTC. Reading about citizenship and military history in fact takes a back seat to subjects such as drill, which merits substantially more instruction time per year than any other topic. The JROTC program also often includes battlefield and military base visits, and takes many cadets to JROTC summer camp on military bases. While battlefield study amplifies the text’s focus on wars as series of strategic choices made by military leaders (to the exclusion of understanding the broader sociopolitical context that produced the war in the first place), base visits amplify a view of military history as culminating in the technological prowess (e.g., helicopters or weaponry) on display at the bases. Also, the program often entails community involvement, such as parades or the presentation of the flag at ballgames in full military dress. Thus, extracurricular activities often reinforce the messages presented in the JROTC classroom.

Three of the largest components of the curriculum are citizenship, military history, and leadership.²⁶ We critique these sections of the curriculum below by comparing them to civilian textbooks and programs.

Civics

The Military as Guarantor of Freedom

In the Army JROTC curriculum, the discussion of citizenship focuses on the Bill of Rights; both LET 1 and LET 2 have sections delineating the first ten amendments. The curriculum declares that the rights presented in the Constitution persist mainly because they are defended by the

military. For example, in LET 2 the unit “Your American Citizenship” contains a chapter entitled “Why the Army Was Established,” implying that citizenship could not exist without military protection (203). The text becomes more specific in its claim when it says, “in addition to granting

basic rights and freedoms, the Constitution also provides the means to protect our freedom and democracy. The U.S. Army was established to ‘provide for the common defense’ of the nation and to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty’” (LET 2:203). In another section, the curriculum states that “American values include freedom, justice and equality, among others listed in the Constitution. To preserve these values, the United States has an army of soldiers ready to defend the nation and what it stands for” (LET 2:212). According to the text, Americans enjoy the rights of citizenship only because the military protects those rights. Presumably, then, Americans must support the military or the Constitution and democracy will fold.

Citizenship through Soldiering

While U.S. citizenship is granted to individuals in a relatively straightforward way (you either are or are not a citizen), cultural citizenship is allocated more equivocally to racial and ethnic groups on the basis of dominant cultural attitudes. Full cultural citizenship entails political and social legitimacy that leads to improvement of the group’s status. For example, Italian Americans have generally achieved full cultural citizenship, while Latinos/as have not. The JROTC curriculum not only declares that legal citizenship is maintained by the military through its state-making and state-protecting function, but also implicitly claims that soldiering is the route to cultural citizenship, especially for minorities whose status within American political culture remains marginal.²⁷ Through the military, the text suggests (as does dominant culture more generally), minorities can prove their loyalty to the nation.

Certain that citizenship coincides with the donning of a uniform, the very first section of LET 1 is “The Spirit of American Citizenship and Army JROTC.” The unit includes chapters on “Construction of Citizenship in JROTC,” “The Model American Citizen,” and “Army Customs and Courtesies.” Thus, as an impressionable freshman at the beginning of his or her JROTC career, the cadet gets the message: join the Army and become a real citizen.

The conflation of citizenship and military work draws on the notion of a citizen-soldier, which military sociologist Segal identifies as a concept growing out of the American and

Throughout American history, however, dissenters have played a major role in securing and guaranteeing civil liberties and Constitutional rights. For example, it was not the military which secured the right of women to vote.

The text assures the reader, “As a JROTC cadet, you are among the most patriotic Americans, those who believe in democracy” (LET 2:207). Here and throughout the text, the military is equated with the core of American beliefs and with democracy; other institutional bodies (e.g., Congress) are implicitly marginalized. Likewise, the cadet/soldier is identified as the true, ‘most patriotic’ American; those who do not support all military endeavors are, by implication, questionable.

French revolutions (1989:10). Many military supporters, Segal included, argue that around this time, “[m]ilitary service emerged as a hallmark of citizenship and citizenship as the hallmark of a political democracy” (Janowitz, cited in Segal 1989:10). Those same people claim that the current U.S. policy of an all-volunteer force has eroded the military’s effectiveness. A close examination of American history reveals that, to the contrary, the draft is an aberration from the norm of a volunteer force. Regardless, the concept of citizen-soldier remains a potent force in military circles. In the eyes of the military, minorities and immigrants often gain citizenship status only through military service. In fact, as Segal notes, “current naturalization laws still extend special benefits to aliens who serve honorably in the American armed forces” (10).

The JROTC curriculum incorporates this notion of soldiering as the avenue to citizenship most evidently in its presentation of Native Americans. The text refers to the “Indian problem” before and during the Civil War, when “the Indians began to terrorize the increasing number of white settlers in the region west of the Mississippi” (LET 3:185). These “fierce and ruthless Indians” were later “controlled...on reservations” (186-187). This language depicts Native Americans as inhuman and animalistic. One very telling passage reveals the text’s perspective: “Land that was promised to the Indians and set aside for them became open travel land for white settlers and prospectors. Fortunately for the Army, the government policy of pushing the

The JROTC curriculum incorporates a notion of soldiering as the avenue to citizenship in its presentation of minorities.

Indians farther west then wiping them out was carried out successfully” (LET 3:185). In this section, the morality of usurping Native American land is not questioned; extermination of “Indians” was fortuitous and utilitarian.

This cavalier approach toward genocide in the military history section of LET 3 contradicts the admission in the citizenship section of LET 2 that policies towards Native Americans were tantamount to persecution (200).²⁸ The sharp difference between these sections, one praising and the other condemning the policies indicates that, in this text, respect for life is predicated not on universal human rights but on American citizenship. While the ‘Indians’ remain enemies, stealing their land is condoned; when they become citizens, the same action is reframed as murderous persecution. Thus, the text can uncritically describe a genocidal military history while softening the racist overtones by celebrating the pluralistic, ‘melting-pot’ myth of American citizenship.

The presentation of “Indians” in LET 3 (p. 185, quoted above) contrasts with the subsequent presentation in the same text of “American Indians,” who are next mentioned in the context of World War II. They are still “fierce,” but now are “dependable” rather than “ruthless” (LET 3:217); a change in adjectives accompanies the shift in legal citizenship status. Furthermore, by omitting a discussion of Native American social and political activism and by highlighting military action by Native Americans, the text suggests that Native Americans won legal and cultural citizenship through military service. For example, the text reports that during World War II “Navajo Indians would gain fame as members of the Marine Corps in the Pacific. They were used to send radio messages in their own language between headquarters. The Japanese thought it was a secret code and tried to break it, something they were never able to do” (LET 3:217). By utilizing their linguistic difference in service to the military, Native Americans appear to gain the rights of citizenship and thereby prove their humanity.

The difference between the presentation of “Indians” and that of “American Indians” exemplifies a general tendency in the text to create a distinct enemy for every conflict and to laud “us” while vilifying “them.” Before Native Americans are classified as citizens, they are disparaged for their fierce nature; later, they are praised for the same characteristic. Such a distinction, in keeping with the melting-pot metaphor, uncritically

supports everyone American and denigrates everyone “other,” even though the boundary between the two shifts throughout the historical period presented.

In keeping with this principle, the presentation of Japanese soldiers during World War II differs substantially from the presentation of Japanese Americans during the same time. According to the text, Japanese soldiers are crazy: the text describes them as “fanatic foe[s]” involved in “suicide charges” who fought “like maniacs” (LET 3:221,222). Like images in the media and elsewhere during World War II,²⁹ the text depicts the Japanese as irrational and subhuman.

Japanese Americans are described with no such pejoratives. In fact, like Native Americans, Japanese Americans contribute to the military through their linguistic difference. The text reads, “Many served in Army and Naval intelligence where they played a significant role in intercepting Japanese radio messages and breaking Japanese codes. One Japanese American named Sergeant Henry Gasko served with Merrill’s Marauders. In one battle he could hear Japanese officers shouting to their men. He would translate the orders so the Americans could meet each attack successfully” (LET 3:224).

Japanese Americans demonstrate rational coherence (as opposed to the insanity of the Japanese) by translating in the midst of fire. Through this act of military service, the Japanese is himself translated into an American.

In another section of the text, the discussion of Japanese American internment during World War II demonstrates how military service functions as proof of citizenship:

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, most Japanese Americans living on the Pacific Coast and some living in Hawai‘i were rounded up and placed in internment camps. This development was a sad event in American history during World War II. The overwhelming majority of these Japanese Americans were loyal American citizens. Some would even get to prove their loyalty in battle (LET 3:217).

Clearly, the Supreme Court and others in government and the general public did not regard Japanese Americans as full citizens, or they would not have been interned. The passage goes on to say, “Germans who surrendered to these [Japanese] American soldiers were totally confused by the presence of men they thought would be their allies fighting for the enemy”

One very telling passage from the JROTC text says: “Fortunately for the Army, the government policy of pushing the Indians farther west then wiping them out was carried out successfully”

(LET 3:217). Thus, Japanese Americans aid the military because they appear to be the enemy but are actually true patriots on the inside. Those (i.e., minorities) whose body represents difference must demonstrate their allegiance to the United States through soldiering. The JROTC text presents military service as the acid test of loyalty, the rite of passage for the rights of citizenship.

Throughout the twentieth century, African Americans have ardently debated whether they should serve in the military when the nation had yet to grant them civil rights.³⁰ Erroneously, the JROTC text presents the picture of a unanimous ‘right to fight’ movement in the African American community that circuitously earned African Americans the rights of citizenship. According to the text, during World War II African American soldiers were willing to move to the infantry from “supply and transportation units,” losing rank and taking reductions in pay, in order to prove they could be good soldiers (LET 3:216-217). Having won the right to fight, many African Americans served in Vietnam; on this, the text says, “While it was impossible for minority servicemen to ignore the racial, social and economic problems at home, many distinguished themselves in combat” (LET 2:175). By focusing on African American soldiers and excluding a discussion of African American conscientious objectors or social activists at home, the text links loyalty in the military to the pro-

urement of equality. This argument is strengthened by the relative scarcity in the JROTC text of information on the Civil Rights movement.

The JROTC text’s treatment of women is even more problematic, with the text addressing women very differently than minority males. While it uses multicultural rhetoric to appeal to the latter³¹ (mainly in the citizenship sections), little attention is directed toward women. For example, a section on civil rights (LET 2:196-202) devotes more than three pages to African Americans, but only one page to women. On that page, the text identifies “a form of discrimination called sexism,” the formation of the National Organization for Women (NOW), and the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) (201). This is virtually the only mention of issues concerning women. In fact, even the earlier presentation of the abortion debate is utterly devoid of women: the text reads merely, “there is still much controversy between the ‘pro-choice’ advocates and those who support the ‘right to life’” (LET 2:194).

The status of women in the JROTC text is marginal because women do not serve in combat positions (see also Herbert 1993, Morris 1994). Since women do not fit the ‘citizenship through soldiering’ model established in the JROTC text, the text cannot tie advances in gender equality to military service. The text’s focus on the combat contributions of soldiers yields a silence concerning women.

The Conflation of the Civilian and Military Spheres

Although the text suggests that cadets earn citizenship through soldiering, “the irony of military service is that when citizens become members of the Army, they give up some of the freedoms that they have sworn to defend” (LET 2:216).³² The non-democratic nature of the military presents a dilemma, in that it disrupts the text’s move toward equating the military with citizenship. This problem is avoided by reducing the appearance of controversy in public opinion among citizens.

JROTC heralds the Bill of Rights as “the basic guidelines” that “keep America’s democracy running smoothly” (LET 2:196). The tone is rather forthright, with little acknowledgment of how controversial the Constitution can be. This is evident when we compare the presentation of the Second Amendment in the JROTC text to that of a mainstream, ninth-grade Civics text (Saffell

1992). The JROTC text mentions laws restricting the sale of certain weapons and establishing a ‘cooling off period’ (LET 2:193). It then says, “Although these laws are intended to protect the public and lower crime, many people feel that such restrictions violate their Second Amendment rights. A popular argument is, ‘If guns were outlawed, only outlaws would have guns’” (LET 2:193). This presentation is typical of the text: it sums up a highly controversial issue in two sentences. Furthermore, it introduces a supposedly popular slogan from the National Rifle Association (NRA) without citing the source. The NRA is normalized in other ways as well; for example, *Training and Doctrine Command Supplement 1 to Army Regulation 145-2* encourages formal membership of cadets in the NRA. An Air Force JROTC text, *Careers in Aerospace*, makes the point even more strongly:

JROTC documents encourage formal membership of cadets in the NRA.

“It is well known that the Founding Fathers encouraged an armed citizenry... Modern advocates of gun control, registration, and the banning of gun ownership should at least be aware that their efforts, well intentioned as they may be, are probably unconstitutional” (76). In contrast, the civilian high school Civics text devotes an entire page to the debate over gun control, including one paragraph each for Handgun

Control Inc. and the NRA. It concludes by asking students to “list the main arguments for and against gun control laws” (1992:300). Further, in another section the civics text explicitly notes that NRA is a special interest group (1992:191). The Civics text presents a more expansive view of controversy and encourages students to think about different possible interpretations of the Constitution.

The civilian text presents a more expansive view of controversy and encourages students to think about different possible interpretations of the Constitution.

On Gun Control

Civilian Text

From Civics (1992:300):

The Second Amendment of the Constitution deals with the right to bear arms. Of course, America has changed a great deal since 1791 when this amendment was adopted. At the time, most of the land beyond the 13 states was wilderness. Settlers needed guns to shoot animals for food and clothing and to defend themselves against Indians and outlaws.

Today there may be as many as 120 million guns in the United States — about one firearm for every two Americans. Most of these are rifles and handguns that law-abiding people keep for hunting or for protection. Still, every year many injuries and deaths are caused by guns, and Americans remain divided over the issue of gun control.

Groups, such as Handgun Control, Inc., that support gun control laws propose banning all handguns. They feel that these small, easily hidden guns make it too easy to kill people. In 1985, more than 9,000 Americans were murdered with handguns.

Opponents of gun control argue that gun ownership is as important a Constitutional right as

freedom of speech. They say that gun control laws do not keep guns out of the hands of criminals. They argue that gun control laws would leave citizens no means of protecting themselves against armed criminals.

The National Rifle Association (NRA) has long opposed any kind of restraints on gun ownership. Over the years the NRA has built a powerful lobby of 2.8 million hunters, gun collectors, and police officers. It has been very successful at blocking gun control laws and defeating pro-gun control candidates at both the national and state level.

In recent years, attention has focused on semi-automatic assault rifles. These guns can hold 20 or more cartridges and fire a shot every time the trigger is squeezed.

There may be more than 1 million semiautomatic rifles in private hands. Their spread has caused a change in public opinion about gun control. More than half of those polled in a recent survey favored a ban on semiautomatics, and many states have introduced or enacted laws to ban these weapons. But Americans remain deeply divided over the issue of gun control laws.

Military Text

From Army JROTC textbook (LET 2:193):

The original purpose of the Second Amendment was to preserve the right of each state to maintain an armed militia. During the American Revolution, citizen-soldiers, or minutemen, used guns to fight for their freedom. Today, our national defense is well-organized and highly sophisticated; civilians do not fight unless they are drafted into one of the armed services during a crisis.

However, private citizens still have the right to keep guns, although the states can regulate the ownership and use of firearms. Gun control laws

are often controversial because it is difficult to balance public safety with an individual's Second Amendment rights.

Some gun control laws require a ‘cooling off period’ of several days after the purchase of a gun before a person can actually receive it. Other laws have to do with the type of weapon — for example, a machine gun — that an individual can own. Although these laws are intended to protect the public and lower crime, many people feel that such restrictions violate their Second Amendment rights. A popular argument is, “If guns were outlawed, only outlaws would have guns.”

In JROTC, history is written so as to suggest that there is only one way to view the past, neglecting to mention diverse interpretations and failing to encourage students to take a critical perspective on sources. The single point of view it does provide is a pro-military one: that is, it celebrates or uncritically accepts the military's role in all circumstances.

In the JROTC text there is an attempt to downplay the interpretive nature of the Constitution as though “it leaves no room for ‘guess-work’ about basic human rights” (LET 2:195). This reductionism is intimately tied to the conflation of the military and civilian spheres. To resolve the apparent difference between the two realms, the text presents a conflict-free democracy that respects constituted authority in precisely the way the military does. The text exhorts cadets to assume allegiance, defined as “loyalty to a government, country, ruler, group, cause or thing,” as a central responsibility of citizenship (LET 1:243). It continues:

American citizens, for example, owe allegiance to their nation. The United States was founded by people committed to the idea that the national government be run for the people and by the people. By pledging allegiance to the United States, you are pledging loyalty to the idea of the American democratic system. (LET 1:243)

Many think of democracy as the free exchange of ideas, including criticisms of government leaders and institutions: in fact, *Civics* (the civilian text) defines this “open exchange” as the “hallmark of a free society,” and states that “access to new and different ideas allows a democracy to grow and change” (100). The JROTC text is constructing a very different definition, one closed to disparate values and hence to conflict. In a similar fashion, the text implores students to respect constituted authority. It reads:

A basic strength of every government is the understanding of its people to uphold and respect the constituted authority of those in public office. However, the obligation goes beyond the government. It is also the respect for authority figures of the church, school,

home and other institutions. As long as these authority figures work within the scope of their constituted authority, citizens should accept their judgment and decisions...It is necessary and important to respect constituted authority, even in high school. Constituted authority is an important concept in JROTC. You have an obligation to respect the constituted authority of your instructors and the cadet chain of command. You have the same obligation to respect the rules and policies of the U.S. Army. (LET 1:244)

In this passage, the conflation is clear: civilians should respond toward leaders in the same manner that cadets obey JROTC and Army commands. By melding the civilian and military spheres, the text teaches militarism, which has been defined as “a domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states” (Vagt 1937).

In the JROTC text, the Department of Defense serves as an icon of the harmonic convergence between the civilian and the military realms: “The Department of Defense is a balance between civilian control of the military and military influence on civilian organizations, such as businesses that do defense contract work” (LET 2:206). Yet the relationship is far from ‘balanced’: recent economic shifts have revealed just how dependent many American businesses had become upon the military, and how vulnerable defense industry communities and states are to changes in DoD funding or programs (Markusen, Hall, Deitrick, and Campbell 1991). In fact, such dependence has become reality for many businesses, media sources, and universities. With JROTC, militarization becomes the norm for public high schools as well.

History

History from a Single, Military Point of View

The Army JROTC curriculum’s approach to the American past focuses on, but is not restricted to, military history. Level 1 begins with an overview of all the major wars in which large numbers of American soldiers were involved, excluding those which were supported by American dollars or arms, or where American military personnel had covert roles. The second, third and fourth year texts move from the pre-

sent back through the Revolution.

The history is written so as to suggest that there is only one way to view the past, neglecting to mention diverse interpretations and failing to encourage students to take a critical perspective on sources. The single point of view it does provide is a pro-military one: that is, it celebrates or uncritically accepts the military’s role in all circumstances. This acceptance includes the

Army's intervention in domestic situations, such as labor disputes, public disorders, and racial conflicts (LET 3:185). The text fails to inform students about the controversy surrounding the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army in 1920, the sometimes exterministic nineteenth century wars against Native Americans, and the procurement of the Philippines and Puerto Rico as colonies. The curriculum also disregards the role of diplomacy or other factors, such as trade, in regulating and maintaining relations between nations. In addition, while current historical teaching methods in standard classrooms emphasize that there are other conceivable pasts (had certain factors been different), the JROTC text is written as if no other outcome were possible. In particular, each war is portrayed as an inevitable consequence of some previous events.

The JROTC text puts an unrealistically positive face on the military by suggesting that war produced long term, positive social change, as when the Spanish American war is presented as having “helped to dim the sour feelings between the North and South as all Americans united together to fight for one cause” (LET 1:213). The text is missing other information relevant to military history, including the twentieth century history of radical increases in military spending, the structuring of industrial development and American social relations by the military and by war, and the impact of war and war preparation on the environment.

Little attention is paid to the enemy's society or motives or to the ravages of war. In describing the Indian Wars, for example, the text notes that after the Civil War, “the Indians began to terrorize the increasing number of white settlers in the region west of the Mississippi. Much of the work of the Army in defeating the Indians and pushing them further west was undone” (LET 3:185). And later, as the wars expanded into the Southwest, the Army encountered the Apaches, who were “fierce and ruthless fighters. However the Army had excellent leaders who were skilled in Indian and guerrilla tactics. After a campaign of five months, the Apaches were trapped and their chief, Geronimo, surrendered” (LET 3:186). With the exception of one battle, no death tolls or social consequences are described.

Wars are presented as technical rather than moral or social problems. One might argue that this kind of strategic approach is appropriate to military training because it emulates the ideal of

an apolitical military that technically executes wars whose existence is unavoidable and whose extent and goals are set by civilian leaders. There are two problems with this argument. First, the text includes both explicit and tacit political stances towards each war, describing why they were necessary and good and, more implicitly, when policy makers erred. The text notes, for example, that “as in Korea, U.S. military operations were limited [in Vietnam] by political restrictions...Air operations suffered the most under these restrictions...which kept them from using the full potential for air power” (LET 2:173). Such commentary undermines the principle of civilian control of the military. Second, the JROTC text treats the cadet learner as if he or she were not a civilian. That is, it is written as if the reader did not need to make informed judgments about whether to support a particular foreign policy and related wars. The text assumes the reader will simply follow directives from the government. Understanding the roots and political dimensions of war requires critical questions about a war's causes, consequences, and alternatives.

Contemporary educational theory and textbook writers focus on the importance of analytical thinking in all subjects, but particularly in history, social studies, and the humanities. A widely used high school history textbook, *The Americans* (Jordan, Greenblatt, and Bowes 1994), for example, fosters critical thinking skills using techniques absent from the JROTC text. It presents in its narrative at least some diversity of opinion about each war fought by the United States. *The Americans* describes the substantial public doubt about whether the United States should fight in World War I and World War II; African American soldiers' resistance to (and frequent desertion to the other side in) the war fought in the Philippines at the turn of the century; and the role of the media in creating public sentiment for the Spanish-American War.³³ It also provides a set of “Critical Thinking Questions” or “Critical Thinking Activities” after each section. For example, in a section on the Vietnam War, students are asked to imagine an alternative history that might have emerged (rather than simply accepting all elite decisions and all history as having had only one possible outcome) and are also allowed to imagine a range of positions about the war (something impossible in the JROTC text) (see following box).

The JROTC text treats the cadet learner as if he or she did not need to make informed judgments about whether to support a particular foreign policy and related wars.

On Vietnam

Civilian Text

From standard history textbook, *The Americans* (1994:876):

- *Evaluating Decisions: Review the two-thousand-year history of Vietnam and the Indochinese peninsula. Might a careful study of this history have convinced United States politicians not to have become involved in Vietnam? Explain.*
- *Do you think the Vietnam War was constitutional?*

On the question of the atomic bombing of Japan, *The Americans* presents several original documents, including the Potsdam Proclamation and a Japanese boy's first-hand account of the bomb's effects. It asks students to analyze primary sources and imagine themselves in the historical moment (see box below). The Army JROTC text gives scant attention to atomic weapons. In

Military Text

From Army JROTC textbook (LET 2:177,183):

- *List three major political restrictions on U.S. military operations in Vietnam.*
- *List two things the United States hoped to achieve by bombing North Vietnam.*
- *List four terms of the Paris Peace Treaty that ended the American involvement in the conflict in Vietnam.*

the discussion of World War II in LET 3, the entire reference to this most fundamental fact of military and global life is included in the box below. The consequences of nuclear war — a military fact of central importance — are left undescribed. The exercise questions asked restrict students to repeating information given in the text.

On World War II

Civilian Text

From *The Americans* (1994:763):

- *Did the Potsdam Proclamation give Japan fair warning that the Allies were about to use a nuclear device? Should it have revealed this? Explain.*
- *What would you have found most startling in President Truman's announcement that a nuclear device had been dropped on Japan?*

The JROTC texts focus less on America's longest war, in Vietnam (15 pages), than on World War II (28 pages), the Civil War (38 pages), or the Revolution (27 pages). *The Americans*, the civilian history text, gives more extensive treatment to all the material it covers, but the ratio of its focus on Vietnam in comparison with other wars is much more representative (28 pages on Vietnam, 32 pages on World War II, 26 pages on the Civil War, and 40 pages on the Revolution). The JROTC history avoids dis-

Military Text

From Army JROTC textbook (LET 3:226):

- In August 1945, President Truman made a fateful decision. After being briefed on the costs of the conquest of Japan, President Truman decided to use a new weapon. On 6 August, a lone B-29 bomber from the Marianas dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On 9 August, another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The next day the Japanese agreed to peace.*
- *Write a sentence describing the military significance of [a list of battle sites including] Hiroshima.*
 - *Refer to the Chapter Conclusion and list four results of World War II for the United States.*

cussion of more controversial aspects of American history (ignoring, for example, very important differences in historical views of the Gulf of Tonkin incident [LET 2:171]) and favors an emphasis on American battlefield successes (with the invasion of Cambodia, each bombing campaign over North Vietnam, and Vietnamization through 1973 all said to have been successes).

When the text mentions diverse points of view about the Vietnam War that are not pro-

military, it presents them in a distorted and negative light. At first mention, the demonstrations against the war are depicted as “violent,” with no evidence presented for this non-standard historical interpretation of the American peace movement of the 1960s and 1970s. In the conclusion, the American people are said to have been “confused” about the war, and the disagreements among Americans about the war are presented as “a threat to national unity” (LET 2:183). As in the sections on civics, the JROTC text uses military principles — of order, unity, and obedience — to analyze the history of the civilian sphere. This approach rejects and erases the conflicts of interest and of viewpoint that are normal and necessary; it undercuts the democratic principle of constructive and open discussion of such conflicts.

The depiction of Vietnam in the JROTC history sections centers around the argument that the war was good and necessary. The United States took on — and should continue to assume — the “responsibility for being the world’s police officer for democracy” (LET 2:183). This notion, as well as the categorization of South Vietnam as a democratic state, is controversial, but the text does not acknowledge this or encourage students to deal with these

multiple historical interpretations. Without attention to the diverse political viewpoints that exist in American society, the JROTC text cannot avoid being propagandistic. By ignoring the fact that the military has produced much disinformation about this and other wars, the text fails to encourage critical thinking about historical sources, the writing of history, and war itself.

The JROTC text argues that one negative consequence of the war was the “lean times and criticism” to which the military services were subjected in the later 1970s:

The U.S. military was recovering from the unpopular war in Vietnam. As a result, the military fell prey to a negative public attitude and major cuts in military spending during most of the 1970s. . . . The size of the armed forces was reduced by over one-third. Air Force and Army aviation units were cut dramatically. . . . The Vietnam Conflict and the protests it generated created a social upheaval in this country. The result on [sic] the military was nearly devastating. (LET 2:184-85)

Here, too, diverse points of view are avoided; the clear implication is that the military should be as large and powerful during peacetime as during war — surely a political opinion rather than an historical account.

The JROTC text erases conflicts of interest and of viewpoint, undercutting the democratic principle of open discussion.

Leadership

Obedient Leaders: The Illusion of JROTC as a Junior MBA Program

For a number of years through the mid-1980s, Army recruiting ads emphasized the technical training that one could get in the services. Recruiters also emphasized that the services provided many opportunities to learn how to operate computers and other advanced technologies. If hundreds of thousands of enlisted people are needed to do simple manual labor in the service, of course, selling the services as a technical skills training course was misleading. A national debate about the supposed benefits of military service ensued from a 1985 *Wall Street Journal* article presenting data showing that people who came out of the services had not gotten the technical jobs promised by service advertising, and that their post-service employment options were dim. A series of research studies (reviewed in Barley 1994) disputed the claim that service in the new (post-Vietnam era) technologically

sophisticated military enhanced a veteran’s chances of getting a high paying, technical job. Perhaps in response, the theme of recruitment ads and brochures changed soon after, emphasizing the leadership skills or intangible benefits soldiers acquired. The goal was to sell the military as preparing veterans for white collar, management jobs.

The JROTC textbook enters this debate about what skills people get out of their military service, but without announcing its intentions. By turning the focus onto *intangible* skills, such as leadership, acquired in JROTC and in the military, the services make claims that are more difficult to verify or disprove.

“Leadership” training constitutes a striking and central feature of all of the services’ JROTC curricula. It is centrally featured in promotional videotapes sent to recruit new schools to the

program and students to existing school programs: in one segment, JROTC graduates are shown running a successful small business with skills claimed to have been learned in the program. JROTC textbooks describe sets of principles, rules, and types of leadership, suggest that these definitions and prescriptions are based on scientific findings on the qualities of a good leader, and argue that they can be used in all of the student's future lifework. The definitions of leadership used are not the usual ones, though; among other things, the focus is not on choosing a leader, but on following one. As such, leadership as taught in the JROTC text is a "value... rather than... a set of skills" (Selden and Feldman 1975).

Principles of leadership in the JROTC text are both abstract and simple, even simplistic. For example, leadership values are said to include "courage, candor, competence, and commitment" (LET 3:27); a leader's decisions are said to be made through identifying the problem, gathering information, developing courses of action, selecting among them, and implementing the one chosen; and relevant skills are said to include planning, coordinating, organizing, directing, and controlling resources. These are fairly empty ideas, but they suggest that advanced skills are being taught.

The text frequently purports to teach leadership through specific examples of military figures. Rather than presenting descriptions of how they made decisions, though, in most instances, the individuals are simply idealized, and the details of their battles presented. These leadership lessons are designed to instill positive orientations towards those of high rank and towards heroism, defined almost solely as risking one's life in battle.

The text defines leadership as the "art of influencing your team to accomplish a mission" (LET 1:75), and in the process covers what it defines as effective communication skills. At the same time, the text focuses on inculcating the habit of instant compliance in soldiers to leaders' commands, rather than the kinds of listening and dialogue skills required in consensual problem solving in non-military and non-hierarchical civilian settings. A leader's or communicator's orientation towards others is always justified in the text by its utility: does he or she get the desired result. Leadership is taught through drill with and without arms (e.g., LET 1, Chapters 3-7), which involves eliciting highly automatic,

unthinking responses from a group.

The sections on leadership are designed to introduce students to the notion and practices of the military "chain of command." As such, they teach students how to follow orders as well as how to give them, although they downplay the idea of obedience. At the least, they try to subsume obedience under the more attractive rubric of leading others. The leadership sections teach how to be obedient while still remaining in control of others. They purport to teach students to think for themselves and to exercise personal responsibility, but the stronger message is one of conformity, non-individuality, and following "duly constituted" authority. Army JROTC regulations (32 CFR 542) describe one of the objectives of the program as developing "responsiveness to constituted authority." Much of the discussion of leadership focuses on the leader maintaining face and on followers showing respect to people in high positions. The text teaches the cadet to ask, "Have I acquired the skill of getting others to see and treat me as an authority figure?"

This and other definitions of leadership in the JROTC text emerge in the context of military institutional structure and needs: organized as a rigid hierarchy, the military's mission and operating principles are sent from the top (the Commander-in-Chief, the Pentagon) down. While some other American institutions have these features as well, everyday life in a democracy is often (and ideally) structured around less hierarchical groupings, around operating principles which may be fluid and ambiguous, and around the notion that political figures ("duly constituted authorities") are in fact servants of the public. The JROTC text suggests it is teaching a general life skill when in fact it is teaching a limited, military version.

The militarized nature of these concepts of leadership becomes more evident when compared with alternative views of leadership found in other educational curricula. Compare, for example, the ideas used by the Youth Action Program in New York City. In its widely used handbook, *Leadership Development* (Stoneman 1988),³⁴ leadership is defined as "engaging young people in making decisions," decisions which are made by consensus after all participants are heard. Also key to this image of leadership is that it requires full information before making decisions.

The Youth Action Program notes that "the ultimate goal of leadership development is to

Leadership is taught through drill, which involves eliciting highly automatic responses from cadets.

motivate people to take responsibility for the future of humanity.” In contrast, JROTC teaches in-group loyalty, in part by focusing on the leader’s responsibility to a mission handed down from another, higher ranking member of the group: “Your loyalty to authority and to the mission can influence your team’s cooperation to [sic] completing that mission” (LET 1:75). It also centrally teaches giving and following orders. In

the military curriculum, leadership consists of not questioning authority; in the Youth Action Program’s handbook, leadership is being able to imagine the route to changing seemingly difficult and permanent conditions of existence. Only the latter is clearly functional for learning how to operate in an egalitarian, open and rapidly changing society for which rules of understanding and coping are in flux.

On Leadership

Civilian Text

From *Leadership Development* (Stoneman 1988:1):

What a Good Leader Does

- Elicits the best thinking of the group, synthesizes ideas, and helps find the key issue. By listening well, encouraging participation, welcoming ideas, stopping attacks, appreciating people, setting a positive tone [sic].
- Is absolutely reliable. A good leader does what she says she will do.
- Builds unity. A good leader builds cohesion among the group members and between the group and other parts of the program, agency, or community.
- Uses good group process. Uses democratic, consensus decision-making, defines clear and realistic goals, maximizes participation, resolves conflicts among group members, helps create group cohesion and mutual support.

Military Text

From Army JROTC textbook (LET 1:75):

Principles of Leadership

- Know your team and look out for its welfare.
- Train your team to work as a team.
- Seek and take responsibility for your actions.
- Set the example for your team.
- Keep your team informed [about the mission, assigned by superiors].

A recent assessment of the post-service employment problems facing the large number of new military retirees appeared in the March 30, 1994 *Wall Street Journal*. It noted that economic restructuring of American corporations entailed making drastic cuts in middle management jobs (to which military retirees traditionally aspired), as American business turns from a hierarchical management structure to “team-based” approaches.

While the military and the JROTC curriculum use the idea of the unit as a team, it is more on the order of a football team with a coach who calls all of the plays than a team on the model of current thinking in business and community service organizations where leadership is discussed.

In the latter, all members of the team are ideally contributing ideas and effort to the whole. Creativity, flexibility, and risk-taking rather than conformity and following orders are at a premium. These different definitions of leadership create problems for those who move from military settings to the business world, as noted by David Lewin of the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles: “[there is] an increasing disconnect between the way the military is organized and gets its work done, and the way business is organized and gets its work done” (*Wall Street Journal*, 3/30/94). The disparity in definitions of leadership makes JROTC’s claim to prepare the cadet for business and personal success questionable.

Part 3:

Conclusions

Embedded in the Army JROTC curriculum's presentation of citizenship, history, and leadership are militarist messages about the nature of democracy, the appropriate relationship between civilian and military spheres, the inevitability of war, the character and value of other cultures, and the military as a catalyst for social development. The text encourages the reader to rely uncritically on the military as a source of self-esteem and guidance. It suggests that women and minority men have further to go than white men in becoming full citizens.

Untrained in the educational values of a plural, public classroom, the instructors undoubtedly communicate to students the value of a military career, and the values of the military itself. Those values, including an emphasis on dispute settlement through force, an uncritical view of American history, and an emphasis on obedience, make JROTC antithetical to the goals of teaching students how to participate in a democracy, resolve conflicts peacefully, evaluate sources, and think analytically. More broadly, it can even be argued that the militarization of education and other social institutions poses a

threat to the very continuation of a democracy (Dunlap 1992-93).

School districts contemplating the introduction or the continuation of JROTC units need to consider a variety of issues beyond the curriculum itself. There is no evidence that the program reduces dropout rates, increases the knowledge or analytic skills of those who participate, or prevents drug abuse. There is evidence that other non-military programs and personnel can do these things. And there is concern that the expansion of the JROTC program diverts local school funds from other educational programs, represents a form of tracking, introduces weapons into schools, and constitutes a proliferation of military influence into what should be a strictly civilian world of education and youth services. While many JROTC personnel would clearly like to serve youth, the goal of the Department of Defense of defending its budget, employing its veterans, and garnering new recruits is not consistent with such service.³⁵ The costs of accepting JROTC money and the military's agenda for young people far outweigh the unproven benefits.

The costs of accepting JROTC money and the military's agenda for young people far outweigh the unproven benefits.

Appendix A Federal Funding of JROTC Programs (millions)

| | FY92 | FY93 | FY94 | FY95 |
|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Army | | | | |
| U | 10.334 | 12.541 | 16.933 | 16.814 |
| O & M | 32.786 | 45.727 | 69.093 | 65.387 |
| | 43.120 | 58.268 | 86.026 | 82.201 |
| Navy | | | | |
| U | 4.552 | 10.865 | 10.049 | 10.574 |
| O & M | 8.565 | 14.899 | 18.484 | 21.171 |
| | 13.117 | 25.764 | 28.533 | 31.745 |
| Marines | | | | |
| U | 1.630 | 2.906 | 2.373 | 3.450 |
| O & M | 3.258 | 5.824 | 5.104 | 7.491 |
| | 4.888 | 8.730 | 7.477 | 10.941 |
| Air Force | | | | |
| U | 5.064 | 9.365 | 10.157 | 11.171 |
| O & M | 10.381 | 18.559 | 16.510 | 20.908 |
| | 15.445 | 27.924 | 26.667 | 32.079 |
| Total | | | | |
| U | 21.580 | 35.677 | 39.512 | 42.009 |
| O & M | 54.990 | 85.009 | 109.191 | 114.957 |
| Grand Total | 76.570 | 120.686 | 148.703 | 156.966 |

O & M - Operations and Maintenance (DoD portion of instructor salaries, textbooks, travel, educational materials, and misc.)

U - Uniforms and Subsistence

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)(MPP)(AP)

Appendix B Number of JROTC Units and Average Enrollment

| | FY92 | FY93 | FY94 |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Army | | | |
| Units | 835 | 1,150 | 1,252 |
| Enrollment | 126,287 | 137,403 | 197,353 |
| Navy | | | |
| Units | 229 | 226 | 360 |
| Enrollment | 28,658 | 38,788 | 44,612 |
| Marines | | | |
| Units | 80 | 124 | 149 |
| Enrollment | 11,667 | 11,767 | 11,867 |
| Air Force | | | |
| Units | 320 | 426 | 506 |
| Enrollment | 44,429 | 43,806 | 56,526 |
| Total | | | |
| Units | 1,464 | 1,926 | 2,267 |
| Enrollment | 211,041 | 231,764 | 310,358 |

Appendix C Post-graduation Plans of JROTC Cadets, 1993

| | Total Grads. | Total Entering Military Programs | Enlisted (% Total Military) | Officer (% Total Military) | Academies (% Grads.) |
|--------------|---------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Marines | 1,272 | 496 (39%) | 420 (85%) | 76 (15%) | 19 (1.5%) |
| Air Force | 5,452 | 2,785 (51%) | 1,951 (70%) | 834 (30%) | N/A |
| Navy | 3,335 | 1,365 (41%) | 996 (73%) | 369 (27%) | 52 (1.6%) |
| Army | 11,000 | 4,760 (43%) | 3,100 (65%) | 1,660 (35%) | 160 (1.5%) |
| TOTAL | 21,059 | 9,406 (45%) | 6,467 (69%) | 2,939 (31%) | 231 (1.1%)* |

*These statistics do not include a small number of students entering military academies from Air Force JROTC, which did not provide the figures.

(Source: Department of Defense)

Appendix D Percent Minority Participation in JROTC (1993-94 School Year) and Active Component Enlisted Service

| Service Branch | JROTC | New Recruits (FY92) | Enlisted Active Duty (FY92) |
|------------------------------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Army | 57 | 30 | 41 |
| Navy | 48 | 31 | 30 |
| Air Force | 47 | 18 | 23 |
| Marines | N/A | 25 | 30 |
| Comparable U.S. Population Segment | 31* | 30** | 24*** |

* U.S. High School Population (1991)

** U.S. 18-24 Population (FY92)

*** U.S. 18-44 Population (FY92)

(Sources: Department of Defense; National Center for Education Statistics 1993)

Appendix E Percent Female JROTC Cadets and Instructors (1993-94 School Year) and Active Duty Services (FY93)

| Services | JROTC Cadets | JROTC Instructors | Active Duty Services |
|--------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Army | 41% (63,300) | 0.6% (17) | 12.5% |
| Navy | 39% (15,256) | 0.9% (6) | 11.0% |
| Air Force | 39% (22,388) | 1.4% (13) | 15.0% |
| Marines | 37% (5,013) | N/A | 4.4% |
| TOTAL | 40% (105,957) | 0.8% (36)* | 11.8% |

*This does not include Marine data

(Sources: Department of Defense; Women's Research and Education Institute 1994)

Appendix F JROTC Academies

Another component of the JROTC expansion is the startup of new JROTC academies, known as “JROTC Career Academies” and “JROTC Partnership Academies.” At present thirty JROTC Career Academies are in operation nationwide; ten JROTC Partnership Academies are slated to open in the 1995-1996 school year.

In October 1992, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced its plan to jointly establish military career academies with the Department of Education (DoE). This plan is part of the larger JROTC expansion program initiated that year. The Department of Defense has targeted large, financially-strapped urban high schools and advertised itself as an alternative educational resource.

The JROTC Academy is modeled on the longer-standing high school career academy (Robyn 1993; Department of the Army Memorandum 1993). More than 100 of the latter career academies are in operation across the country. Traditionally, academies link academic instruction with vocational training in a small school environment. The idea is to expose students to real world occupations and to bring in outside resources through, for example, adoption by outside businesses. Involvement in the academy is intended to help smooth the transition for students from school to work. Most of the traditional (non-military) academies continue to operate.

JROTC Career Academies

JROTC Career Academies combine academic and technical training with mandatory JROTC training, which includes retired military service members as instructors and the pro-military curriculum detailed elsewhere in this report. JROTC Career Academies are set up on the ‘school-within-a-school’ model, functioning as separate from the larger school in which they are housed. The academies have special staff and facilities assigned to them. Academy cadets take many of their courses together (including non-JROTC subjects) in classes that are separate from non-JROTC students in the school. School districts are responsible for providing overall guidance and program direction, coordinating resources with curriculum development and forming business partnerships. One teacher usually coordinates the JROTC Career Academy and is given extra time in the day to attend to academy

administrative duties.

Like the traditional academy, the JROTC Career Academy Program enrolls only a small number of the students from the high school in which it is situated. For example, in Balboa High School, located in San Francisco, there were 400 incoming freshmen expected in September 1993. Of the 400 freshmen, about 50 were expected to enroll in the Army JROTC Career Academy. Students generally join the program during their freshman year, so that after four years a total of 200-250 students would be enrolled in the JROTC Career Academy.

In some schools, where the number of students in the academy is higher, the academy itself is block-rostered, which means that the 60-70 students from each class are divided into groups and would take all their classes with the same group of 15-20 students every day. The classes are scheduled in blocks, which means that all academic classes are taught in two or three period blocks of time, so that vocational classes connected to the academy and other activities (like field trips) can take place in a more flexible time period. For example, Math, Social Studies, English and Science would be taught from 8:30am to 12:30am while the remainder of the day would be devoted to the vocational and military classes. In many JROTC Career Academies students take field trips to military bases.

The JROTC Career Academies claim to serve “at risk” students. However, most JROTC Career Academies favor students who maintain a certain grade point average and high attendance rates and those who are not considered disciplinary problems.³⁶ These restrictions would seem to exclude from the program those students who are defined as most “at risk.”

JROTC Career Academies begin to aggressively recruit students fairly early. For example, at Grace A. Green High School (Dayton, Ohio), recruitment for the Army JROTC Career Academy includes brochures which are sent to all students in the district in 8th and 9th grade. Similarly, at Bay View High School (Milwaukee, Wisconsin) the Naval JROTC Career Academy, known as RedCat Academy, plans to develop a video presentation which will be shown at open houses and career fairs. This means that students

as young as 13 and 14 will be encouraged to apply for the academy and therefore join JROTC.

At some JROTC academies, students and their parents are required to sign a contract. For example, at RedCat Academy (Milwaukee, WI) students must agree to the following conditions: participate in the Junior ROTC Training program, wear the uniform as directed by the academy, never bring dishonor or discredit to the academy and understand that it is a “special honor to be selected as a cadet.” The penalty for not fulfilling these and other conditions is being dropped from the program. Parents are required to give the Naval JROTC Career Academy permission to transfer their child out of the academy if s/he violates the conditions of the student contract.

On the other hand, there is no such contract to hold the program accountable for acts of misconduct. For example, in February 1994, three members of the Balboa High School (San Francisco) JROTC drill team were badly beaten during a JROTC hazing ritual and the incident was known to but not reported by the JROTC staff. Such practices appear to have been common at the school, as they are in the military more generally (Daniels 1992; U.S. General Accounting Office 1992b). One San Francisco school board member commented, “Because of its history of hazing, I believe the military has no place in public schools” (*San Francisco Examiner*, 9/30/94). The injured students are currently suing the school district and JROTC and school personnel for negligence (see Appendix G).

High schools that house a JROTC Career Academy receive some amount of federal funding, at least in the beginning. Some schools receive a full grant of \$500,000 for two years, while others receive partial funding for four years. In either case, since the military has no obligation to continue funding beyond the agreed upon time periods, schools may be solely responsible for raising funds to continue the program. Even with these grants, the school district must come up with additional money for the program. For example, Balboa High School is scheduled to receive a total of \$561,361 in grants over the course of two years. The school district is expected to pay the remaining \$161,886 that the program needs for those two years. Afterwards, the school district will be responsible for the cost of the new JROTC instructors, upkeep of new equipment, cost of JROTC trips, etc., which could total no less than \$300,000 each year.

JROTC Partnership Academies

The Department of Defense (DoD) has signed a multi-million dollar contract with Cities in Schools (CIS), a national non-profit organization, to set up ten Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) “Partnership Academies” beginning in the 1995-1996 school year. Each academy is expected to enroll approximately 200 students.

Cities in Schools, which describes itself as the nation’s largest drop out prevention program, a claim that has not been independently verified, is best known for its work arranging partnerships between businesses and public schools.

CIS local staff, some of whom are Americorps or national service volunteers, sell the program to schools, solicit and review proposals from target schools, and work to line up business partners. Although the partnership is described as an agreement between CIS and the Army, the Department of Justice (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) is a co-sponsor and serves as the fiscal agent for DoD funds committed to the program. JROTC units associated with the academies may represent any of the four service branches.

The cost of the program is shared between the DoD and local sources (school districts, businesses, etc.). Initial awards (covering the first three years) can be as much as \$400,000. CIS and the DoD require that host schools obtain matching funds at the rate of one dollar for every four dollars awarded. Obtaining support beyond the first three years is the responsibility of local officials.

Junior ROTC and the Academies

One point of confusion is the relationship between JROTC and the academies. The academies, both the regular career academies and the partnership academies, are tied to the regular JROTC program in two key ways: 1) academy students are required to join JROTC and 2) the academy curriculum incorporates key components of the standard JROTC curriculum. The major differences between the new form of JROTC and traditional JROTC units are the funding formula and how JROTC fits with the other parts of the school curriculum and schedule. Therefore, most of the problems we’ve outlined with the traditional JROTC program apply to the academies as well.

Appendix G Statement of the Board of Education of the San Francisco Unified School District Regarding the City Attorney's Investigation into the District's JROTC Program, June 14, 1994

Following a widely reported hazing incident at Balboa High School, this Board and the Superintendent of Schools asked the City Attorney's Office to conduct a thorough investigation into hazing in the District's JROTC program. After almost two months of investigation at Balboa High School, which involved more than four dozen interviews with students, parents, teachers, administrators, police and medical professionals, the City Attorney's Office reported to the Board two weeks ago. The investigation is continuing; however, based upon the interim investigation report, the Board is prepared to release the following statement at this time.

The City Attorney's Office initially focused its investigation on the hazing incident at Balboa High School on February 22, 1994. On that date, the student commander of the boys' drill team sent three members of the drill team through "ranks" four times. Ranks is a ritual form of punishment in which JROTC cadets are punched repeatedly on the upper arms and shoulders as they walk between a gauntlet of drill team members. Ranks, like all other forms of hazing, is a practice that is forbidden by state law and Board policy. After sending these three cadets through ranks, the student commander of the drill team assaulted one of the three cadets.

The investigation report reveals that the response by certain JROTC and school personnel to this incident was inadequate. Insufficient care

was given to ascertaining all of the facts quickly and reporting them accurately to appropriate authorities within the District. This inexcusable delay and lack of administrative coordination meant that insufficient attention was paid to the needs of the injured students.

Significantly, interviews with several current and former drill team members revealed that, for at least the last five years, ranks was a common means of student-to-student punishment in the JROTC program at Balboa High School. Even if this occurred without the knowledge of administrative personnel, such an abhorrent, long-standing practice on a public school campus is inexcusable. In addition, the Board has learned of at least one similar hazing incident in the fall of 1993 that was known to several staff members at Balboa High School, but not reported to the District.

Because of these disturbing findings, the Superintendent has recommended changes to the program, which the Board will discuss with the Superintendent in the ensuing weeks. The Superintendent will also actively pursue various avenues of discipline for certain personnel.

The Board will continue to confer with the Superintendent and the City Attorney's Office as the JROTC investigation begins to focus on other campuses within the District. As further investigation reports are submitted, the District will consider appropriate action.

A Note on Sources

The primary source of the data used in the report is the Department of Defense, including the JROTC commands for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Coast Guard materials were not examined. (During the 93-94 school year the Coast Guard ran only one JROTC program.) Most of the data was obtained through formal requests made under the federal Freedom of Information Act. Army JROTC course materials were the most carefully examined, although Navy and Air Force texts were reviewed as well.

This report examines the most recent comprehensive revision of the Army texts, completed

in 1989-1990. Many minor changes have been made since then, most of them technical corrections (spelling, grammar, etc.) From time to time supplements have been added. For example, new sections have been added on the Gulf War, the Panama invasion, and alcohol awareness.

In addition to reviewing curriculum materials, we examined JROTC publicity materials, information packets and videos distributed by JROTC officials to school districts considering the program, government laws and regulations pertaining to JROTC, and training materials for JROTC instructors.

Endnotes

- 1 32 Code of Federal Regulations 542.5:3c.
- 2 In some states JROTC credits do not count toward eligibility for state colleges and universities and JROTC grades are excluded when computing Grade Point Average for student financial aid eligibility. California is an example of such a state.
- 3 This report does not discuss the Coast Guard JROTC program. During the 1993-94 school year, the Coast Guard ran only one JROTC program.
- 4 Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1993.
- 5 Low usage rates may be caused by a number of factors, restrictive eligibility rules being one of them.
- 6 The term minority refers to African Americans, Latinos/as (non-white), Asian and Pacific Americans, and Native Americans.
- 7 Government officials also speak of the programs' impact on "inner city" youth. Richard Darman, Budget Director in the Bush Administration, put the figure at "about 400" inner city JROTC programs of the 1,500 programs in existence in 1992. Vanneman (1994) claims, however, that only 28 of the 450 new Army JROTC units added from 1992 to 1993 are in inner cities. It is unclear how JROTC officials define "inner city youth."
- 8 These figures differ somewhat from those used in other parts of this report. They are taken from various enrollment reports for the early fall of 1993. Other figures used in this report are average enrollment for the school year.
- 9 Army JROTC has fewer Latino/a cadets proportional to their representation in schools with JROTC programs, 10.5 percent versus 13.3 percent, respectively.
- 10 The unemployment rate for 16- to 19-year-old African American men is 42.2 percent compared to 19.2 percent for white men in the same age group as of December 1992.
- 11 In a 1988 study, Hexter and El-Khawas spell out both sides of the argument about a possible competition between college and the military for African Americans.
- 12 Military work is more common among the lower two quartiles of the American class system generally (Department of Defense 1993).
- 13 Not surprisingly, given what is known about test bias and racial disadvantage, 73 percent of whites but only 40 percent of African Americans passed the test (at levels I-III) (U.S. Congress 1992).
- 14 African American male veterans also have significantly lower median incomes than white male veterans, a gap of approximately \$9,000 per year (National Center for Veteran Analysis and Statistics 1994).
- 15 These training benefits are concentrated in the Air Force and Navy; they are found less often for Army and Marine Corps veterans.
- 16 African Americans as a whole are under-represented in the officer corps. As of FY93, African American representation is greater among enlisted women (34 percent) than among women officers (13 percent); African American men make up 20 percent of all enlisted men, but only 6 percent of all male officers (Women's Research and Education Institute 1994:16).
- 17 "Marine Corps Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (MCJROTC) Information and Certification Procedures," enclosure 1.
- 18 The same arguments have been made in the past for the program. Arguing for the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, one representative said, "If we need anything in this country today, we need something that would instill some semblance of discipline, some respect for order, and some respect for authority in the young manhood of America. I can conceive of no more beneficial piece of legislation than this measure" (Malishchak 1974:5).
- 19 This information on graduation rates comes from Navy, Marine, and Air Force responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. The Army never responded to the same request. Other attempts, made through the Public Affairs Office of Army JROTC Command, to obtain statistics supporting Army statements regarding dropout/graduation rates have been unsuccessful.
- 20 One might expect a higher enrollment in the lower grades during a period in which new programs are being phased in.
- 21 Such promotion also reveals that there is often an underlying assumption in the classroom that these students are interested in serving in the military.
- 22 Department of the Army Memorandum ATCC-HS (145), Subject: Army Junior ROTC Instructor Employment. March 27, 1994. It should be noted that these ranges are slight underestimates because they do not include what the retired JROTC instructors would be receiving for housing allowance if they were to return to military service. This allowance varies depending on the cost of living in that part of the country.
- 23 For example, the application for certification as a Marine Corps JROTC instructor requires an autobiographical essay of not more than 500 words, a listing of educational experience and duty assignments, answers to several more brief questions, and a full-length photo in uniform. Applicants are encouraged to write about any experience with youth work, but there are no specific questions about their teaching skills or experience.

Certification decisions are made by a Marine Corps board upon review of this application.

The Navy JROTC instructor applicants are repeatedly reminded in their application about standards of physical appearance. The required medical exam checks compliance not only with height and weight standards but also an additional standard for maximum percentage of body fat. An instructor put on probation for failure to conform to Navy appearance standards may be required to weigh in weekly and obtain a monthly body fat measurement from a health care professional.

- 24 The Army had 732,403 soldiers in 1991, although it is scheduled to lose 27 percent of its size over the first five years of this decade. In 1993 it had over 1,100 JROTC units.
- 25 The Air Force text closely resembles the Army text with its heavy focus on character, leadership, and ethics from a military perspective. It pays much attention to the aerospace industry and relatively less attention to matters strictly military. The Navy text uses somewhat more difficult language, but it, too, discusses complex issues of history, interpersonal behavior and ethics as if the questions and answers were simple, noncontradictory or without disagreement in the population of readers. However, the text goes into much more detail on the subjects it takes up than the Army text; it particularly deals more extensively with details of naval operations, international relations and national security doctrine. As such, this text more clearly presumes than does the Army text that the JROTC cadet plans a career in the military.
- 26 Communication, another large section, mainly teaches public speaking and study skills. Cadet challenge, the fifth large section, presents basic health and nutrition information.
- 27 One does not need to be a U.S. citizen to serve in the U.S. military, and a host of military regulations describe the often elaborate conditions under which an alien gains citizenship rights through service. One of them is posthumously through death in combat (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, Koppe 1993).
- 28 The text reads: "American Indians were persecuted since the first white people came to America. Early European and American policy was one of conquest, even extermination, of the Indians." (LET 2:200).
- 29 See, for example, the analysis and political cartoons presented in *War Without Mercy* (Dower 1986).
- 30 See Gill (1985) for an extensive discussion of this debate.
- 31 This fact is most evident in a recent (1993) video produced to recruit eighth graders to join JROTC that prominently features minority males in JROTC uniforms and as school authorities or successful JROTC graduates.
- 32 The Air Force JROTC text is not as honest with its cadets; it claims, "When you enter the Armed Forces of the United States you lose no legal rights" (*Leadership Education IV:103*).
- 33 Neither text deals with pacifism or conscientious objector status (although LET 3:202 discusses a conscientious objector who became a war hero during World War II).
- 34 This handbook is widely used in youth programs nationwide by community-based organizations like Youth Build USA.
- 35 There is a parallel between JROTC and the presence of commercial television ("Channel One") in the schools. Channel One provides school districts with free television monitors, a VCR, and a satellite dish in order to show news and commercials in the classroom. Like commercial television, JROTC also institutionalizes the use of public schools for the benefit of organizations whose primary goals are not educational (i.e., for profit or recruitment and public relations), but under the guise of educational reform and with unsubstantiated claims to improve the quality of education. The parallels extend to how these programs are brought into the schools. Since the programs are advertised as competitive (that is, more districts might apply to receive the program than the number which actually get it), school boards often feel that saying no to a program means they will "lose out" (permanently) to another school. Further, the two programs' distribution in the nation's schools is skewed; Channel One is two times more likely to be found in the poorest than in the wealthiest schools (Morgan 1993). In addition, both programs are advertised as having been "nationally validated," promoting the idea that local boards do not need to review and approve their content.
- 36 The RedCat Career Academy, a Naval JROTC unit with a focus on construction at Bay View High School in Milwaukee, appears to be an exception. Program materials list the following criteria for participation: "8th grade students who have missed over twenty days of school in at least one semester of 8th grade; 8th grade students who are one year below grade level; 8th grade students who did not pass the math and reading competency test required by MPS; 8th grade students who have low motivation or disinterest in school as determined by interviews with teachers, counselors and administrators; 8th grade students who are economically disadvantaged."

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